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HISTORIC VICTORY IN INDOCHINA

THE EDITORS

Health Care and Socialism in Chile

HILARY MODELL
HOWARD WAITZKIN

Peasants' Perspectives in Underdeveloped Countries

ERNEST FEDER

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NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

We have fallen far behind in reading manuscripts and answering correspondence. There are a number of specific reasons for this unfortunate state of affairs: the large backlog which accumulated when two of the three editors were out of the country for six weeks last fall, the time required to lecture around the country on the economic crisis and China, illness—to mention only a few. But basically the problem goes deeper. For better or worse the demands on MR have outgrown our limited resources. In a way this is a source of gratification since it seems to indicate that the magazine and press are playing a useful and expanding role in an international revolutionary movement which is growing rapidly in the context of the present far-reaching crisis of the world capitalist system. But it also generates problems and contradictions for which we can see no solutions. The best would be if we could bring in some younger people to share the work and gradually assume responsibility for the operation. While that is always a hope for the future, it is

(*Continued on inside back cover*)

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THE HISTORIC VICTORY IN INDOCHINA

> South Vietnam . . . shows that in the underdeveloped countries today reactionary regimes, no matter how lavishly equipped and "advised" by the United States, cannot win wars against dedicated revolutionary guerrillas. This is not the place to attempt to assess the implications of this momentous fact. We only record our conviction that its significance will loom larger and larger as the years go by and that in retrospect the struggle in South Vietnam will be recognized as one of the turning points of the history of the second half of the twentieth century. — Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy, *Monopoly Capital* (1966), pp. 203-204.

These are indeed historic days. As we write comes word of the fall of Phnom Penh. The end in Saigon will not be so simple, but it cannot be long delayed. Desperate efforts are being made by die-hard elements in the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon to re-involve U.S. armed forces via a "humanitarian" mission of evacuating Americans and politically compromised Vietnamese. These efforts may even succeed: the record of the United States in Indochina during the last quarter century should have taught us that no crime, no stupidity, no brutality is beyond or beneath U.S. rulers in their grim determination to hold onto their far-flung empire. And now that total defeat in Indochina looms, we must assume that there are powerful elements in the Washington political-military apparatus who, like Hitler in the last days of the Third Reich,

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will quite literally stop at nothing to keep the "endless war" from ending.*

But however much mischief these madmen may yet be able to perpetrate, they are not likely to affect the outcome. The war aim of the U.S. ruling class in Indochina has all along been the maintenance of a neocolonial regime in South Vietnam as a shield for a vast imperial domain in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. There have certainly been hawks with more ambitious ideas (conquest of North Vietnam, even provoking a war with China), but in every showdown they have lost out to the "defensists" who have been willing to provide enough American aid to shore up a puppet regime in Saigon but have always balked at the prospect of getting bogged down in hopeless land war against South Vietnam's powerful neighbors. These defensists, the vast majority of the ruling class, would still be willing, even eager, to keep on supporting the Saigon regime if they felt there was any reasonable chance of its survival. They went along with Kissinger's peace-negotiations charade in 1972-1973, hoping that the Paris agreement might provide the answer. And for two more years most of them probably thought it was providing the answer. At the same time by means of acts of Congress prohibiting further use of American forces in Indochina they took pains to ensure that, should the Thieu regime collapse, there would be no repetition of the Nixon bombing interventions of 1970, 1972, and 1973. In other words, they were serving notice that this was Thieu's last chance. Since his regime has now collapsed, precisely as many feared and some foresaw, the chance that they will go on throwing good money after bad seems small.

Meanwhile, President Ford idiotically continues to assure everyone that "for just a relatively small additional commitment

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* We make no apologies for strongly recommending at this crucial turning point a reading or re-reading of our own collection of essays *Vietnam: the Endless War,* by Paul M. Sweezy, Leo Huberman, and Harry Magdoff (MR Press, 1970). We believe that this little volume still offers the best account of the origins and nature of the Indochina war available in English. And we are gratifyingly confirmed in this judgment by our friend Daniel Ellsberg, whose knowledge of the literature on Vietnam is far deeper and more extensive than ours (see back cover).

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in economic and military aid, relatively small compared to the $150 billion that we spent, that at the last minute of the last quarter we don't make that special effort, and now we are faced with this human tragedy. It just makes me sick every day I hear about it, read about it, and see it." (*New York Times,* April 17). The *Times* story continues: "Mr. Ford said that even now he was 'absolutely convinced' that if Congress made available soon the $722 million he had requested for military aid to Saigon, 'the South Vietnamese could stabilize the military situation in South Vietnam today.'" Nixon once compared the American people to children; Ford must think they are morons.

For Ford what is happening in Vietnam is a "human tragedy," and Kissinger speaks solemnly of this country's "moral" responsibility to go on pouring out arms and money for the rotten fascist regime of the arch-corruptionist and torturer Nguyen Van Thieu. What incredible hypocrisy! Where were these great humanitarians and moralists when more bombs were being loosed over Vietnam than were dropped in all theaters combined in the Second World War? What words of concern or compassion did they utter when Nixon carpet-bombed Hanoi during the supposedly Holy Season of 1973? Did they ever condemn, let alone act to eliminate, the shame and horror of the tiger cages and the dozens of other jails in which Thieu locked up, under inhuman conditions, more political prisoners than probably any other country in the world?

But, screams the whole bourgeoisie in unison, "the Communists" violated the Paris Accords, and for that high crime and misdemeanor no punishment is too condign. We can well believe that Gerald Ford never read the Paris Accords and has no idea what is in them. But Kissinger? And the *New York Times?* Kissinger negotiated them, and the *Times* published them in full. These gentlemen know perfectly well what is in the Accords, and they know that the signatory who violated them, and indeed never for a moment intended to live up to them, was none other than Thieu himself.

The case of the *Times* is particularly instructive. For the past two years the editors, in a lofty show of impartiality, have repeatedly rapped the knuckles of both sides in Vietnam for

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allegedly breaching the Accords. The proof? Very simple: there has been a lot of fighting going on, attacks and counter-attacks, both of which are by definition in contravention of the military cease-fire called for in the Accords. In recent days, however, the editors have belatedly remembered that the Accords also contain political provisions. In the leading editorial of April 18th, the editors write: "North Vietnam is obviously acting in massive violation of the military provisions of the 1973 truce, but President Thieu has just as clearly violated the political provisions of that accord—the procedures for establishing a coalition National Council to create a new political constitution for South Vietnam." Guilt is still apportioned to the two sides equally, but at least there is now recognition that what was negotiated at Paris was not a simple military cease-fire. Should we therefore give the *Times* credit on the time-honored principle of better late than never?

Absolutely not. The whole approach which tries to picture the Accords as a balance of military and political provisions is in reality a Big Lie of Hitlerian proportions. *The essence of the Accords is a reaffirmation of the Geneva Agreement of 1954 which the United States refused to sign and fought two decades to erase from the historical record.* Chapter I, Article 1 of the agreement signed in Paris on January 27th, 1973, states flatly and unambiguously: "The United States and all other countries respect the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Vietnam as recognized by the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam." Not *South* Vietnam but Vietnam. That is what the whole war has been about from the beginning, and indeed since long before the United States got directly involved. Let us review the record: we all tend to forget, especially when we are subjected every day of our lives to a steady bombardment of lies and distortions.

The struggle of the Vietnamese for "independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity" began nearly a hundred years ago against the French colonizers. It reached a dramatic and apparently triumphant climax with the declaration in September 1945 of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). Four months later elections to a National Assembly gave an

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overwhelming majority to Ho Chi Minh and the Vietminh which he headed and which had carried the brunt of the struggle against both the French and the Japanese. No nation in the world has ever been born with a better claim to nationhood: one language, one culture, clear-cut territorial identity, a history stretching back over many centuries, an effective and overwhelmingly popular government.

But the French were determined to re-establish their rule in Vietnam. With crucially important assistance from the British they returned, and by means as treacherous and brutal as any recorded in the shameful annals of modern imperialism they sought to impose a new colonial regime headed by the former emperor Bao Dai, who in 1945 had renounced his throne and under his civilian name of Vinh Tuy had accepted the honorary position of Supreme Councillor to the government of Ho Chi Minh. Before the end of 1946, open warfare raged all over the country and continued until the crushing defeat of the French at Dienbienphu in 1954. In this eight-year ordeal, Vietnam proved that its will and ability to live were as strong as its original claim to nationhood.

The Geneva Conference of 1954 put the final seal of international legitimacy on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Contrary to the myth sedulously cultivated in the United States ever since, the Geneva Conference did *not* divide Vietnam into two states, North and South; rather it provided for regroupment of military forces north and south of a demarcation line and for general elections to establish a new democratically based national government. The "Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference" could not have been more specific on this crucially important point. Paragraphs (6) and (7) of this Declaration state:

6. The Conference recognizes that the essential purpose of the agreement relating to Vietnam is to settle military questions with a view to ending hostilities and that *the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary.* The Conference expresses its conviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the agreement on the cessation

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of hostilities creates the necessary basis for the achievement in the near future of a political settlement in Vietnam.

7. The Conference declares that, so far as Vietnam is concerned, the settlement of political problems, *effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity, and territorial integrity,* shall permit the Vietnamese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions as a result of free general elections by secret ballot. In order to ensure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been made, and that all the necessary conditions obtain for free expression of the national will, general elections shall be held in July 1956, under the supervision of an international commission composed of representatives of the Member States of the International Supervisory Commission, referred to in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations will be held on the subject between the competent representative authorities of the two zones from July 20, 1955 onward. (Emphasis added.)

The United States refused to sign the agreement on cessation of hostilities, dissociated itself from the final declaration, and encouraged and supported its bought-and-paid-for puppet regime in Saigon in the latter's refusal to implement the general-elections provisions.* And still to this day the U.S. government has never hesitated to claim the Geneva Agreements as the basis of the legitimacy of the South Vietnamese state whenever it has suited its purposes to do so! In this of course it has been followed by the entire bourgeois press. "The regime of South Vietnam," writes Leslie H. Gelb in a review article in the *New York Times* Sunday Review of the Week section (April 6), "was effectively created in the summer of 1954. In the spring of 1975, it is perishing. Its creation as one of two zones of Vietnam by the Geneva conference marked the end of a terrible colonial war. Its impending demise . . . marks the end of a grim civil war." Wrong on two counts: the Geneva conference did *not* create the "regime of South Vietnam," the United

* The reason for this U.S. attitude was stated clearly enough by President Eisenhower when he wrote in his book, *Mandate for Change*: "I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held as of the time of the fighting, possibly 80 percent of the population would have voted for Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than chief of state Bao Dai."

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States did that; and the war now ending is *not* a civil war but a war of national liberation of the Vietnamese people against the United States and its neocolonial puppets. How long would it have lasted, Mr. Gelb, if the Vietnamese had been left to settle it among themselves?

Some well-meaning people may concede the truth of all this; may agree that from the point of view of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam—which on a strict legalistic interpretation has never ceased, since its establishment in September 1945, to be the legitimate government of all Vietnam—the purpose and effect of the Paris Accords were to reaffirm the Geneva Agreements, with the United States this time being forced to sign what it had refused to sign two decades earlier; may even join in condemning the United States for treacherously violating and repudiating its own pledged word. At the same time these same well-meaning people may argue that despite this sordid history, this country still has a moral responsibility for and to South Vietnam which cannot be honorably evaded. This responsibility, so the argument runs, stems from the danger of a "bloodbath" which is supposed to hang over the heads of all those who, however unenthusiastically or even unwillingly, worked for or with the Saigon regime.

The truth is that this argument, like the one which charges the DRV with violating the Geneva Accords, is based on lies —or rather one Big Lie, the so-called Hue Massacre—plus a total lack of comprehension of the nature and tasks of the national liberation forces. Since it is important to be able to convince friends (or potential friends) of this truth, it will be worthwhile to examine the issues in some detail.

First, the bloodbath at Hue. That it actually occurred is not open to doubt: the question is how and why. To answer this question we can do no better than quote rather extensively from a careful review of the evidence by Roger Neville Williams in the April 4th issue of *New Times,* a bi-weekly with the subtitle "The Feature News Magazine":

> Hue was always sympathetic to the NLF [National Liberation Front]—a proud city that the Americans disliked for they could never work their will there. The GVN [Saigon regime] liked it

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even less. Saigon's interior minister said in 1967, "If the people of Hue revolt, there is only one thing to do. Wipe Hue off the face of the earth."

When the NLF and the North Vietnamese entered Hue [during the 1968 Tet offensive], they met with little resistance. In many districts they were openly received as liberators. Losing a city so easily maddened the Americans, who ordered in Marine Phantoms, called up the big guns of the 7th Fleet and opened up with artillery. After 26 days, *Time* reported that "Hue lay in smoking, putrescent ruin." Journalist Wilfred Burchett, one of the few Western experts on the NLF, told me in Paris, "The NLF sanitary squads were forced to bury air strike victims in mass graves nightly."

In Hue, as in the rest of Indochina, the bloodbath came from the sky, showers of steel into pools of blood, 7.3 million tons of bombs, 16 million tons of bullets and shells. . . .

Now for the "massacre." It is clear from available evidence that as many as 300 to 500 people may have been executed by the NLF in all of the Hue district. But the evidence is as confusing as it is interesting. The mayor of Hue, one Col. Phan Van Khoa, was the source of most U.S. and British newsmen's reports. He later claimed the communists had executed 300 officials and buried them in a mass grave. But on February 22, in the midst of the battle, he announced there would be public executions, that week, of "communist agents." An American official in Hue told a reporter, "There will be summary executions, public executions of VC and hopefully some of the infrastructure." . . .

After Hue was reoccupied, Col. Khoa and other Vietnamese officials began taking newsmen to see mass graves, graves of 10, 20, or 30 people, some of whom had apparently been summarily executed. Nineteen graves, containing 1,000 bodies, were discovered in all. That's not many considering that U.S. as well as unofficial estimates put the civilian death toll from air strikes and shelling at 3,000 to 10,000—Dr. Vennema [director of Canada's aid mission to Vietnam] is certain that at least 10,000 died. Groups of people were found with hands tied with wire and bullet holes in the back of their heads, confirming two things: the NLF had, indeed, executed certain officials and "enemies of the people"; and Col. Khoa had carried out *his* threat. A USAID man said, "For many Vietnamese in Hue, there were a lot of old scores to settle. . . . Some of the hates go a long way back."

Williams then proceeds to show how on the foundation of this, by his own account "confusing," evidence, the whole elaborate story of the "Hue Massacre" was built up:

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With no evidence other than, at most, a few hundred bodies that were clearly executions, and with this evidence completely in the hands of GVN officials and interpreters, the massacre story grew. On November 13, 1969, a year and a half later, an AP story said, without qualification, that 3,000 had been killed by "Vietcong assassination squads." Again TV news showed more exhumations near Hue, lots of Vietnamese wailing, understandably, and a single grave that now, alone, contained "2,000 bodies." Curiously, this was the week that My Lai came to light, and, even more curious, the U.S. Embassy on November 24 suddenly found a long-lost enemy document captured near Hue in 1968. The Americans said the document said the NLF admitted to successfully "eliminating 2,900 people at Hue." Then, on December 6, Robert Elegant in a long piece in the *Los Angeles Times* reported Douglas Pike's recent "intensive investigation" of events in Hue in which he concluded that "the Communists had slaughtered almost 6,000 civilians for political purposes." This was double all previous figures. Pike, a good friend of the White House, known to most journalists as little more than a propagandist for the U.S. policy in Indochina, said the "massacre of Hue will be the pattern for nationwide action should the Communists conquer South Vietnam. . . . If the Communists win decisively . . . the night of the long knives would begin."

Thus was completed the story of the "Hue Massacre" and its dire meaning, all ready to be trotted out the minute the Saigon regime showed signs of collapse. Which is exactly what has happened during these past two months: the Saigon regime *has* collapsed, and the alleged massacre of civilians at Hue by the NLF *has* once again become a major theme of the U.S. media.

Please don't misunderstand us. We are not arguing, let alone trying to prove, that no NLF executions of Saigon government officials or agents took place in Hue. We do not pretend to know with any certainty, but it would be very surprising if that had been the case. The NLF itself had been subjected to the most brutal and bloodiest imaginable forms of repression ever since the Diem regime set out to establish its power in 1954. According to the above-quoted account by Roger Neville Williams, the CIA-organized and U.S.-financed Phoenix program alone had, by William Colby's own estimate, murdered 21,000 "infrastructure" (i.e., NLF cadres), and this

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was but one aspect of the U.S.-Saigon campaign to physically eliminate the "enemy." Moreover, whatever executions may have been carried out by the NLF in Hue in February of 1968 occurred in the context of one of the most horrible and gruesome episodes of the whole Vietnam war. It is not necessary to condone such summary executions, if indeed they did take place; but it is necessary to see them in proper perspective. And that means not to exaggerate their possible number, not to play up those perpetrated by one side while ignoring those of the other, and above all not to draw from one special situation general and totally unsupported conclusions about the overall policy of the Vietnamese liberation forces in an entirely different situation seven years later. What we are saying, in other words, is that while a bloodbath certainly did take place in Hue in 1968—mostly as a result of U.S. bombing and shelling—and while summary executions by both sides may have been a relatively minor aspect of it, nevertheless it has no relevance whatever to the problem which now, quite legitimately, concerns many Americans who recognize that past U.S. policies in Indochina have been disastrous, i.e., the problem of the course to be followed by the liberation forces toward the very large number of Vietnamese (the number is much smaller, both absolutely and relatively, in Cambodia) who at one time or another and in one way or another have aided and abetted the Saigon regime.

The only sensible way to analyze this problem is, first, to look at what the liberation forces are saying (their record of telling the truth is amazingly good); and, second, to try to understand the difficulties which face them and the ways in which they can reasonably hope to cope with these difficulties.

What they are saying is that with the exception of Thieu and possibly a small number of his closest collaborators, there is no group or category of South Vietnamese who cannot separate themselves from their past and work their way back into membership in good standing in a truly national and independent Vietnamese community. This was spelled out in elaborate detail, specifying category after category, in a remarkable statement issued by the representatives of the PRG in Paris on

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April 2nd and published in the *New York Times* the next day. The statement contains not one word of recrimination or threat, only persuasion and inducement; the spirit which animates it is so obviously one of conciliation and forgiveness that one cannot possibly reconcile it with an intention to liquidate large numbers of Saigon collaborators.

There are very solid historical and objective reasons why the Vietnamese liberation forces should adopt this position, quite apart from any humanitarian considerations. In the first place, their position has all along been that the enemy is imperialism—before 1954, French imperialism, after 1954, American imperialism—and not any particular group or class of Vietnamese. (This of course does not deny the existence of class struggle in Vietnam, a subject to which we shall return presently.) It follows that all Vietnamese, even those who wittingly or unwittingly became the instruments and agents of imperialism, should be given a chance to repent and return to the national community.

But even more important for the liberation forces than maintaining the consistency of their historic anti-imperialist policy and ideology is the need to prepare the ground for the huge tasks of reconciliation and reconstruction which lie ahead. The southern part of Vietnam has been as devastated and torn apart, physically and socially, as any country in history. Filling the bomb craters, restoring the defoliated fields and forests, rebuilding highways and bridges, rehousing the population, establishing a productive base in agriculture and industry suited to the real needs of a largely uprooted and destitute people, and above all recreating a viable social order—these and myriad other urgent tasks face the liberation forces on the morrow of their coming to power. Accomplishing them will take many years and will require the energetic cooperation of every single available human being. Under these circumstances to emphasize past animosities and pursue old vendettas would be the height of folly. What is needed instead is to bind up the wounds of more than two decades of bitter struggle, to calm fears, to persuade everyone who can be persuaded to forgive and forget, to call for a new start toward a better life and a better world.

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And that is precisely the path which the liberation forces are embarking on.

They (and we for enthusiastically supporting them) will of course be castigated by our super-revolutionaries. According to these wiseacres, to seek the broadest possible unity in a class-divided society (as South Vietnam of course is) is *ipso facto* to sell out the revolution and embark on the capitalist road. Give the bourgeoisie an inch, they say, and it will surely take a mile. Look at all the would-be revolutions that have been blocked or aborted by bourgeoisies (private and/or state) which were allowed to retain or regain power. By their policy of unity (which politically will most likely take the form of the tripartite coalition provided for in the Paris Accords) aren't the Vietnamese liberation forces inviting just such a disaster?

The answer, fortunately, is no, not at all. What our super-revolutionaries forget is that while there may be three parties or groups in the government, there will be only one with an army (and what an army!). In Chile, for example, it was more or less the other way around: the *Unidad Popular* was in the government but it had no army at all.

We are not implying that because the gun is in the hands of the revolutionaries there will therefore automatically follow a smooth transition to a new socialist society. That would be ridiculous. The point is that in liberated South Vietnam the transition to socialism is simply not on the agenda now. What *is* on the agenda is a process of revival and reconstruction which, as already indicated, will require the full participation of all the human resources that can be enlisted. In the course of this process the class struggle will of course continue and no doubt intensify. There is not the slightest danger, however, that it will lead to overt counter-revolution, and *at this stage* that is the crucial consideration. Whether the class struggle, as it unfolds in the new and quite unprecedented conditions of liberated South Vietnam, will lead to the definitive political victory of the revolutionaries and the peaceful reunification of all Vietnam as a socialist state firmly on the road to communism, *this* we do not and cannot know now. But we are probably safe in speculating that very much will depend on the success of the libera-

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tion forces in pulling the country together, winning over and educating the confused and unpoliticized elements among the masses, and isolating and exposing the real reactionaries and capitalist roaders.

And we are certainly on firm ground in saying that what the Vietnamese have achieved in the past and are achieving as these words are written provides the best possible reason for optimism about their future. We join progressive forces all over the world in hailing their historic victory over American imperialism and wishing for them a bright socialist future.

(April 20, 1975)

Young Alexander conquered India.
He alone?
Caesar beat the Gauls.
Was there not even a cook in his army?
Philip of Spain wept as his fleet
Was sunk and destroyed. Were there no other tears?
Frederick the Great triumphed in the Seven Years War. Who
Triumphed with him?

—Bertolt Brecht, *A Worker Reads History*

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THE PEASANTS' PERSPECTIVES IN THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

BY ERNEST FEDER

The following paragraphs are intended as a modest contribution to the discussion of the classical role of the peasantry as that sector of the working population which bears the major costs of progress, a role which the Third World now continues to assign to the rural masses. Precisely what are their perspectives in the underdeveloped non-socialist countries in the next 15 to 20 years? The economy of these countries is in nearly all cases based on agriculture, which provides much of the product, employment, and foreign exchange, so that the future seems to depend largely on what happens to these agricultures. By peasantry I mean the "peasants" who have some claim to a plot of land[1]* and the rural landless wage-workers. Although these groups have some divergent interests and ambitions, they both belong to the same mass, or perhaps class, of underprivileged rural poor, subject to the same or a very similar system of

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This article is a summary of an inaugural address delivered at the Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, in October 1973. The full text was published in *Development and Change*, The Hague, vol. 5, no. 2 (1973/1974).

Professor Feder has had many years of experience with the Food and Agriculture Organization and other international agencies dealing with agriculture, especially in Latin America.

* Notes will be found at the end of the article.

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dependence and exploitation. They form the overwhelming majority—at least three fourths—of the rural labor force, and the proportion is growing. Their future looks dismal. To make my point, I have set out tentatively a few theses, which I will discuss in turn.

First thesis: The agricultures of the underdeveloped countries generate increasing pressures which threaten to upset the old "disequilibrium balance" and to undermine their very foundations.

The agricultures of the underdeveloped countries are a composite of, on one side, a large "traditional" sector which controls, but leaves largely unutilized, most of the available human and physical resources and which undergoes a continuous process of decapitalization, and a relatively small capitalistic sector on the other, including the well-established, mostly foreign-owned or controlled plantations producing for export, and more recently the few but increasingly important, heavily subsidized, and not infrequently capital-intensive commercial enterprises producing staple foods and inputs for domestic industries. The very functioning and performance of the agricultural sector generate forces which threaten more and more to upset the old social, political, and economic "disequilibrium balance" and in fact threaten its very existence.[2]

The pressures which upset the old balance may have existed for quite a long time, but they have been intensified sharply since the end of the Second World War. The old disequilibrium balance consists in the almost complete control by a small national and foreign landowning elite of the available land resources and the gradual elimination of the rural masses from direct access to the land through more or less systematic means, some seemingly innocuous, others quite brutal, often amounting to outright land robbery, extermination of tribes or indigenous communities, the forced transfer of people to other agricultural areas or to mines or other forms of slave or slave-like "employment," as now for example in Brazil. The disequilibrium which has become some sort of forced accommodation between the monopolizing landlords and the rural masses is maintained by a pervasive and complex, but still relatively simple, repressive system, whose main objective is to

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secure and maintain a source of abundant, cheap, and obedient labor. Both the traditional and the plantation sectors benefit from this labor-supply situation, and so do many commercial farm enterprises.

The first factor which disturbed this balance was a sharp world-wide increase in the rural population and a rising disproportion between people, land resources, and jobs. It is now an established fact that on the average the equivalent of 30 to 40 percent of the rural labor force is unemployed and the rate is growing.[3] Several causes contribute to rising unemployment. One is mechanization. There are now reliable estimates of the (net) labor replacement effects of tractors in Latin America. In Chile between 1955 and 1965, mechanization in cropping agriculture eliminated 16 million man/days of labor, i.e., the average annual increase of 800 tractors in Chile was equivalent to a decreased need of 6,300 man/years of labor (triple the annual increment in the rural labor force), but more than 6,300 farm workers since most workers never had full-time employment. In Latin America as a whole about 2.5 million men had been thrown out of work (on the basis of 4 per tractor), according to one estimate, but the figure is no doubt highly conservative. Although this is tenaciously contested by conservative economists in universities, the large foundations, and the international lending institutions, the effect of tractorization *must* be net labor replacement, if only because large landowners are resorting frequently to tractors to "get away from the labor problem." From the point of view of the rural labor force it is very fortunate that the rate of mechanization was relatively low until recently. But there are signs that it is rising rapidly and some observers talk about the underdeveloped countries' having become a regular dumping ground for the tractor industries of the industrial nations. If so, more people have been thrown out of their jobs during the past five years than in an equivalent period 20 years ago. Even if there were no labor displacement, mechanization would not be very helpful as a development strategy for the rural masses as long as it does not help create massive *new* employment opportunities in the face of the huge quantities of excess manpower. Obviously no one has as yet dared to suggest that it does.[4]

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To this we must add the built-in inadequacy and inflexibility of management on large farms, particularly but not exclusively in the traditional sector which offers the greatest potential for rural employment. This potential not only is not used, as the land is not fully utilized and production does not increase in step with the growing labor force, but employment actually diminishes there—a development to which few people are paying any attention, fascinated as they are by the small but much propagandized modern farm sector. Thus the traditional sector fails to fulfill an important social function, to provide more employment, and one of the basic reasons is that the motive for monopolizing the land is not to push production to its upper limits but to keep the peasants from owning it or earning a decent living on it.

For the peasantry, the creation of the modern commercial large-scale enterprises is also dangerous: they often require little if any labor, and they threaten the small producers with whose produce they compete. A few large undertakings of that sort, producing for example staple foods, can quickly satisfy domestic markets and in the process bankrupt a large number of peasants.

On balance, developments do not give rise to the expectation that rural employment, and with it rural incomes, will improve in the underdeveloped agricultures and that the terrible problem of unemployment will disappear—quite the contrary.

Another threat to the old disequilibrium balance is the rise in expectations of the rural masses. The rural worker even in the most remote area is hardly the dense and ignorant fellow that he may have been generations ago. He has heard about agrarian reforms, about the Che Guevaras, about the higher incomes and better living conditions of the urban workers; and he is now constantly being promised land or better wages by political parties or his very own government, although he may know that these promises are empty. This is why, with all the outward appearances of great placidity, the peasant world is seething. The slightest weakness in the power structure is used to carry out land invasions, strikes, and even mass rebellions—although in most cases they are short-lived.

Finally I should mention the emergence of what social scientists have referred to as *marginality*, the growing proportion

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of the rural and urban labor force which is not absorbed in an expanding agriculture and economy. Under prevailing conditions, the agricultural and other sectors can continue to produce, and produce more, without having to incorporate these people into productive employment. It is of course true that in the underdeveloped countries an excess labor supply—an industrial and agricultural "reserve army"—is needed, and exists, to keep wages low and facilitate capital accumulation. But the point I wish to stress is that there may be a growing portion of the labor force which is already beyond the stage of a reserve army, a totally superfluous body of people, too poor, too outcast, too miserable, too despairing, too short-lived, to contribute in any significant or meaningful sense, or perhaps in any sense whatever, even to keeping the wage bill low, there already being so many others in the labor force to fulfill this function. Certainly nothing could condemn the existing system more severely than the fact that one might even consider that such a process could emerge or exist. Will these marginal people threaten the foundations of the existing agrarian structure? Since they are poor, they are impotent. But I would suspect that with the proliferation of people who have absolutely nothing to lose, because they possess nothing and have nothing to protect except their lives, they could under the right circumstances, in risking their lives, become an important force to help change a system which is so totally inimical to them.

Second thesis: Powerful forces to maintain and strengthen the existing agrarian structure, regardless of a threatened intensification of agrarian problems, are let loose by the landed and urban elites and by the governments of the industrial nations or important international organizations on which the underdeveloped countries are dependent for survival. On balance, the probability is high that for another generation the pressures which threaten to upset the old disequilibrium balance will prove to be less powerful than forces of the "establishment" to strengthen the status quo.

Open or hidden national and external forces are at work not only to preserve the status quo in the underdeveloped agricultures, their lopsided distribution of wealth, income, power,

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services, and opportunities, but actually to strengthen it. Where progress toward a more just society has been achieved, brutal efforts are made—as recently in Chile—to set the clock back and re-establish the old disequilibrium balance. These forces are internal to the extent that they are part and parcel of an autocratic system of masters and serfs; they are external to the extent that the governments and businesses of industrial nations and the international organizations which they control and on which the underdeveloped countries are dependent for markets, armaments, and loans to keep them from economic and political collapse, exert an at times decisive influence over domestic policy decisions; like the national elite, these foreigners have a vital interest in maintaining an agrarian structure which remains a source of abundant, cheap, and obedient labor and hence of fabulous profits for national and foreign investors.[5]

The forces to which I am referring find their expression in several ways. One is the increasingly tight and effective organization of the land monopolists. Their multiple associations either turn around their economic interests along commodity lines or cut across commodity lines. In the former case, they may compete amongst each other for the available resources; in the latter case, however, they are broadly united to maintain an agrarian structure which is so excessively good to them and to keep the rural masses in their place. The national elites also have formed international associations and powerful lobbies, and hold regular though secret meetings to plan and execute strategies to avoid changes in the agrarian institutions which might be adverse to them. Throughout the world, the landed elite is now well-provided with weapons for armed "self-defense" against the peasantry. Special regiments, trained and equipped by the industrial nations, assure that peasant protests can be quickly, effectively, and brutally repressed, and without fanfare. Special rural police control the countryside, and private plantations have their own "police force" which keeps the workers in line. Special state agencies supervise all organizational activities of the rural masses (e.g., Peru), not to assist them in the productive processes, but to forestall their becoming effective. This impressive array of brute power can contain peasant dissatisfactions for an unpredictable length of time.

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In contrast stands the enforced absence of organization of the rural masses. The fiercest opposition by the landowners is reserved precisely for peasants' and wage-workers' groupings: persecutions, even assassinations, of effective or potential leaders are facts of rural life. In some cases unions or leagues spring up, but their existence is of short duration or they remain ineffective, and even in the best of cases they represent only a small proportion of the rural labor force. Peasant cooperatives are small and impotent, or made to serve the interests of the large landowners and merchants. The rural masses have little or no bargaining power to achieve improvements in their working and living conditions. Equally adverse to the interests of the peasantry are the race, religious, and national issues. In Latin America there are still some countries which are wiping out Indian tribes in order to occupy their land, but this is numerically less important than the systematic repression of blacks or *indios*, or the religious and national rivalries in other parts of the world, stimulated and exploited by the ruling classes to keep the peasantry divided, impotent, and fighting among themselves. I do not see that it is likely that these issues will be resolved in the foreseeable future with the type of governments now firmly established in the underdeveloped countries, military and civilian alike.

No less important is corruption, the function and impact of which are almost totally ignored by social scientists. There is little doubt that it redistributes income in favor of the elite and thereby strengthens the existing power structure.

Third thesis: The industrial nations are increasingly interested in penetrating the agricultures of the underdeveloped countries and have lately found new ways and means to achieve this end. This penetration, even if one assumes that it is not a deliberate strategy to forestall agrarian reforms and other structural changes of benefit to the rural masses, will most certainly have this result.

If one views the historical flow of capital investments from the industrial nations to the underdeveloped regions of the world, it becomes clear that at first these funds were principally channeled into the primary sectors (agriculture and mining). Subsequently they were channeled principally into industry,

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commerce, and banking. A new phase has now begun. Foreign investments in agriculture other than plantations were, until recently, insignificant. Little agricultural land was held by foreign owners, even if plantation land is included, in relation to the total farm land. With agriculture now a major source of political unrest, however, a decisive change seems to occur, although it is not yet clear to what extent and in what precise direction this change takes place, statistical data on this delicate issue being notoriously inadequate. The crucial point is that foreign interest in land now goes well beyond the plantation sector whose relative importance tends to decline in relation to the sectors producing food for domestic consumption or inputs for industry. I refer to this phenomenon as the gradual penetration of the industrial nations into non-plantation agriculture. It occurs directly through land acquisition or concessions, sometimes over immense areas, for a variety of purposes including mining, petroleum, and military installations. Brazil is an interesting if perhaps extreme example. Since 1964, year of the military coup, it has been reported that over 32 million hectares of farm land were purchased, mostly by U.S. citizens or corporations. If correct, the 32 million hectares would represent already about 3 or 4 percent of the total land area of Brazil and *over 10 percent of all farm land*. The immensity of the purchases is reflected in the following table based on newspaper reports and inquiries by a parliamentary committee, the data being only partial:[6]

State	*Number of Purchases*	*Millions of Hectares*	*Average Size of Purchase, in Hectares (Rounded)*
Goiás	18	4.8	300,000
Maranhõe	4	1.8	450,000
Amazonas	8	1.8	225,000
Pará	18	9.9	550,000
Bahía	16 (?)	4.6	290,000
Mato Grosso	?	2.0	—
Roraima	?	.2	—
Total	64	25.1	400,000

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Such land acquisitions are not the result of a few agriculturists' interest in farming activities, but reflect a large-scale program to control Brazilian agriculture. Given the strategic position of Brazil on the Latin American continent, the figures speak for themselves as far as their political, economic, and social implications are concerned. The financial rewards of these investments are obviously considerably less fabulous than similar investments in industry or mining, but the shorter-run political pay-off is substantial: a not-to-be-underestimated contribution to repressing quietly and unobtrusively the slightest form of agrarian unrest.

But there are also no less effective *indirect* mechanisms to control underdeveloped agricultures. The most significant is the "Green Revolution": a strategy of the industrial states to modernize moribund traditional estates, give new luster to private large-scale land monopolization, and expand the markets for industrial agri-inputs manufactured and marketed by multinational corporations, using so-called "high-yielding" seed varieties developed by the Rockefeller Foundation as a vehicle or pretext for the technological and economic penetration of the developing agricultures. The highly subsidized distribution of the new seeds has meant expanded distribution of more and more "sophisticated" farming equipment without which these seeds cannot be used with maximum effectiveness. Given the need for complex agricultural techniques and inputs (the "technological package"), the Green Revolution tends to have its most concentrated application and use on the large farm enterprises, even if it is not actually pushed in that direction. The Green Revolution is a program for large landowners *par excellence* and cannot be different: they are already better equipped, have almost exclusive access to input and output markets, and are the major if not the almost exclusive recipients of agricultural credit. Hence the Green Revolution is far more than the propagation of excellent seeds: it subjects the underdeveloped agricultures to an economic and political control which must result from the transfer of technology; and by the same token, it is, and is meant to be, a world-wide counter-reform program. It has given a new impetus to mechanization, with the disastrous consequences for the peasantry noted earlier.

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Thus the almost incredible phenomenon occurs under our very noses that a "program destined to feed the peoples of the world" causes larger unemployment, greater poverty, and more hunger in the rural sector.[7] The drama is that the governments of the underdeveloped countries, bound for reasons of self-preservation to leave the agrarian institutions untouched, seem to have no alternative road toward greater modernization of the estates, thereby precipitating the very rebellions which they seek to avoid, and hence also their repression.[8]

Fourth thesis: Given the internal and external political, social, and economic limitations imposed upon the governments of the underdeveloped countries, their policy options to remedy the agrarian problems are extremely limited. They will tend to solve what appears as the "easier technical problem" of agricultural production rather than the socio-political and institutional problems and thereby must aggravate agrarian problems as a whole.

Under existing conditions, the underdeveloped countries have in reality few options open to them to "solve" the agrarian problems. One can assume that in the future agricultural programs will have to be acceptable, as in the past, to the landed elite and preferably be undertaken at their initiative. They will not go to the heart of the matter: they will tend to solve the "easier problem" of production rather than the socio-political and institutional problems, although the latter are decisive for balanced agricultural growth; few if any concessions will be made to the peasantry; on the contrary, the programs will bring gains mostly to the large landowners and the businessmen with whom they deal, including foreign investors. Hence three major types of programs, or some combination of them, will predominate: an expansion of colonization projects in countries where public land is available (and it is in most countries); the continuation of small-scale pseudo-agrarian-reform projects; and the modernization of large holdings. The first two are political tranquilizers. At best, they may benefit a handful of peasant families and at worst they will harm thousands of peasants, as in the case of provisions giving property rights to small tenants or sharecroppers for the land they

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cultivate, which estate owners use as a pretext to quickly dismiss these workers so that they cannot benefit from the legislation. Colonization projects and timid land-tenure reforms make no dent in the basic problems of maldistribution of power, of poverty, and of unemployment.

The greatest efforts are likely to continue to go into modernizing large landholdings. The stated goal behind this policy is to increase agricultural production, to bring forth food self-sufficiency and exports. But it is also motivated by a desire to demonstrate that large estates can become more efficient in the use of physical resources and thereby counter the argument that agrarian reforms are necessary because their owners use their land unproductively. This means pushing, at all costs, the growth of more modern, capital-intensive, strongly subsidized, large-scale commercial enterprises, including those producing staple foods. Recent developments in the world food situation which threaten continued shortages of staple foods will prove to be an added incentive, and I predict that there will be no scarcity of resources to carry out this strategy. The result will be sharpened polarization among four sectors in the developing agricultures: the traditional inefficient sector whose maintenance is necessary to keep the peasantry from owning the land; the large commercial enterprises, including the plantations and the new capital-intensive farms; the smallholdings with a stagnant or even declining land area and sharply increased population density; and the landless.

Will governments undertake long-run programs or emergency schemes to solve rural unemployment more directly? Since this problem cannot be solved in the cities because of high rates of urban unemployment, it would be necessary to carry out schemes in rural areas which would attract unskilled labor in large numbers. Of course these would have to be integrated with broad national or regional development plans, since it makes little sense to build schools or agricultural colleges if there is no demand for skills; or to build storage facilities if there is no increase in purchasing power nor improvement in the marketing structure; or to clear virgin land or reforest treeless areas if there are no farm-to-market roads or lumber mills. Hence in order to be meaningful, these schemes should

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be accompanied by deep-seated changes in the economy. By themselves, they would generate new jobs only for the short run. Still, they could present interesting possibilities: a little additional employment is better than none, from the point of view of the peasants. Even so, this would presuppose a determination at the national level that unemployment relief has a high priority and that massive public expenditure must be directed to the rural sector. It is noteworthy that no underdeveloped (non-socialist) country has yet taken any steps in this direction.[9] This reluctance has several obvious reasons: rural unemployment, while extremely serious, exists but is barely visible. It only becomes apparent when the peasants resort to land invasions and other forms of protest. Furthermore, agricultural wages would tend to rise if the rural manpower supply were reduced so that the estate owners, who are accustomed to a large "agricultural reserve army," would oppose such schemes, making them all but impossible to initiate. Another important reason is the difficulty of financing public works on a large scale. Tax landowners? This is unrealistic in societies where a landed elite maintains political control. In addition, most governments suffer from chronic budgetary deficits, and the industrial nations and international lending institutions on which these governments depend would withhold further financial assistance if such unorthodox programs were to be financed through deficit spending. In fact, they would withhold it in any case because an agricultural reserve army is an ironclad guarantee to keep wages low and to bolster the transfer of profits from investments in the underdeveloped countries. As I see it, rural unemployment is here to stay.

Fifth thesis: It can be predicted with a reasonable degree of certainty that one or two cases of more or less radical change in the agrarian structure of underdeveloped countries will occur over the next 10 to 15 years. Under the conditions prevailing in 1973-1974, international power politics will have a greater effect on the longevity and ability to survive of such changes than internal power politics, although much consideration must be given to the structural changes which will take place in other sectors of the economy.

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Although widespread radical changes in the agrarian structure of the underdeveloped countries do not appear imminent, it can be predicted with a reasonable degree of assurance that one or two isolated cases of profound changes in agricultural institutions, tending toward greater economic, political, and social justice, such as we witnessed in Cuba in 1959 and Chile a decade later, will occur during the next 10 to 15 years. What will be the ability of agrarian reforms to survive the internal and external counter-reform pressures which will be set in motion to undo them? In my view, this depends on two sets of circumstances: the constellation of international power politics, and structural reforms in other sectors. In countries such as those of Latin America, the survival of agrarian reforms and even more of a socialist agrarian revolution depends on the one hand on the ability to withstand the infiltration by the industrial nations, and on the other hand on the manner in which the capitalist and socialist blocs have staked out their spheres of influence. The brutal death penalty on Allende's program in Chile executed by the industrial countries should be a serious warning in this respect. With respect to the second point, agrarian reforms can have no lasting and pervasive impact if the marketing, the banking, and the export sectors, at a minimum, are not totally revamped, i.e., socialized. If this does not happen, the private (capitalist) sector will syphon off the material, and with it the socio-political, benefits which ought to accrue to the peasants.[10] The more the capitalistic sectors (marketing, banking, export, etc.) are developed, the greater the need for socializing them. The development of capitalism in the underdeveloped countries may bring them a step nearer socialism, but it also increases astronomically the threat of counter-reforms.

Sixth thesis: With mass poverty and unemployment in the rural sectors of the developing countries, even the most radical agrarian reforms will find it almost impossible to raise simultaneously employment and income of the peasant masses in the shorter run. Obviously this is not a recommendation for inaction but on the contrary it points to the urgent need for action soon.

My sixth thesis deals with the outlook for full employment and greater material welfare of the rural workers when

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radical agrarian reforms are carried out relatively peacefully. With the enormous proliferation of unemployment and poverty in the rural sectors of the underdeveloped countries, and the practical impossibility of creating new employment opportunities in industry at a rapid rate in a short time, and therefore the absolute necessity to solve first the problems of rural unemployment and poverty in the rural sectors themselves, it would be an illusion to assume that even with a radical transformation in the agrarian sector, and regardless of the new land-tenure system or systems which are created, poverty and unemployment can be solved simultaneously. It must be conceded that at least in the initial stages of the transformation of the agrarian structure, which might last years, the goal to reduce unemployment is in conflict with the goal to eliminate poverty.

In some countries which have recognized this terrible dilemma, efforts have been made (and this includes some socialist agricultures) to benefit "first" a small proportion of the rural masses with a relatively high income and ability to reinvest, a minority which would bear the brunt of the responsibility for increased agricultural production. Although some arguments might be found in favor of such a solution, I cannot recommend this strategy: it perpetuates undesirable features of a traditional agriculture, generates new internal conflicts between peasant groups, and creates new vested interests difficult to undo without violent means.

The dilemma which we recognize should not serve to postpone a solution to the agrarian problems of the underdeveloped world. On the contrary, it should be an incentive to set about solving them as soon as possible.

NOTES

1. Peasants are usually defined as those who have access to the means of production (mainly land), but many rural workers have access to land under such tenuous conditions (e.g., sharecroppers) that one can hardly speak realistically about their having access to the means of production.
2. A society can be "in balance" for a given length of time even though its various subsectors are very unevenly matched in terms of their size and bargaining power, the two being inversely related. Hence the term "disequilibrium balance." Such a society can be maintained in balance through the use of force, and the balance is no less real if it

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is so maintained by force. Of course balance is not synonymous with stability.

3. Most rural workers are underemployed. The 30 to 40 percent figure includes the underemployed expressed in unemployment equivalents.
4. It is claimed that jobs lost in agriculture are offset by employment in tractor factories or assembly plants. This claim is absurd.
5. A land-tenure system which is based on a high concentration of ownership and large-scale landholdings is by its very nature an *expansionist system,* as a matter of self-defense and survival, like the slavery system that prevailed in the southern United States. Like the latter, the more it is threatened in its existence, the more ruthless, aggressive, and repressive it becomes. This explains why agrarian problems have become so apparent in the last two decades.
6. The purchasers' names were not given in all cases. For the 64 purchases, there were only 42 purchasers and two unidentified groups; 17 purchases totaling about 9.1 million hectares in Maranhõe, Amazonas, and Pará were registered in the name of one person with a Portuguese name, probably fronting for an investment company. The figures given in the table do not include land concessions for mining, etc. For obvious reasons, this issue cannot be debated publicly in Brazil and is shrouded in great secrecy.
7. For an excellent description of the disastrous impact of the "high-yielding varieties" in Mexico, a model of what threatens other underdeveloped countries in which the Rockefeller seeds and the technological package are being pushed, see Cynthia Hewitt de Alcántara, "The Green Revolution as History: The Mexican Experience," *Development and Change,* The Hague, vol. 5, no. 2 (1933-1974).
8. It is ironic that the Nobel Peace Prize should have been given in 1970 to an agronomist who cooperated in the propagation of the new seeds when, under the circumstances under which they are being disseminated, they are bound to create havoc in underdeveloped agricultures.
9. E.g., a few years ago, Colombia requested the ILO to study unemployment, ostensibly as a prelude to a relief program, but has undertaken nothing since to deal with the situation.
10. An interesting example is Mexico. A study conclusively showed that in a colonization scheme about 15 years after its initiation, 50 merchants and dealers received as large a portion of the income generated in the project area as the 1,000 settlers who were supposed to be the main beneficiaries.

A new and international division of labor, a division suited to the requirements of the chief centers of modern industry springs up, and converts one part of the globe into a chiefly agricultural field of production, for supplying the other part which remains a chiefly industrial field.

—Karl Marx, *Capital* (Moscow: Progress Publishers), Vol. I, p. 451.

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HEALTH CARE AND SOCIALISM IN CHILE

BY HILARY MODELL
AND HOWARD WAITZKIN

The problems that the *Unidad Popular* (UP) government faced in its attempts to restructure the Chilean health system mirrored many of the conflicts and contraindications which led to its downfall. Our purpose in this report is to analyze the changes that occurred in health care during the UP period, the political and economic constraints that limited the viability of the socialized health system, and the dismantling of the health system that has occurred under Chile's present totalitarian regime. We conclude with a brief discussion of the broader relationships between health care and revolutionary social change.

Achieved Reforms

The UP government instituted a series of well-publicized programs to distribute health care more equitably. These pro-

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grams were to be carried out mainly by the Chilean National Health Service (NHS), which Salvador Allende—himself a physician—had helped establish during the 1950s.

In line with Allende's longstanding interests, several programs emphasized nutrition. All children and pregnant or nursing mothers received a half liter of free milk per day. The government instituted public educational campaigns informing families about the nutritive value of milk. To reduce Chile's high rate of infant and perinatal mortality, the government established a system of maternity clinics in small towns and worked to institutionalize the principle of free medical care in all hospitals.

Recognizing the importance of environmental health, the government began aggressive programs to improve housing conditions and sanitation. The NHS also organized an emergency-care system that guaranteed emergency services, free of charge, for all Chileans. The government moved quickly to require innovation in copper mining and similar industries to reduce the incidence of occupational diseases.

Facing a severe maldistribution of health care, which favored wealthier areas in cities while rural areas and low-income urban districts suffered from shortages of facilities and personnel, the government tried to increase in-patient and ambulatory services in rural provinces. In addition, a government-sponsored "health train" toured the southern provinces, treating 30,000 people. To combat alcoholism, the Ministry of Health established alcohol treatment centers in many cities and rural areas; and it tried to develop a popular consciousness about alcoholism and other health problems by publishing comic books that addressed public-health issues in a popular and humorous way.

Democratization and Decentralization

None of these reforms was particularly threatening to the Chilean medical profession. However, the UP also encouraged changes in the health system that portended important shifts in financing and power. It was these modifications, to which health professionals reacted with anger and opposition, that ultimately crippled many of the more politically neutral reforms. In general the government supported increased worker and consumer

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control. In the health care system, consumer-worker control gradually emerged at two levels: the neighborhood and the hospital.

Neighborhood level. Even before the UP government took office, the Ministry of Health had divided Chile into geographical health "zones" and each zone into several health "areas." For example, in Santiago there were four major health areas having at least one base hospital that served the entire area. Within the area were a number of smaller localities, each encompassing a population of 50,000 to 75,000 and served by one neighborhood health center (NHC).

Part of the UP program was to decentralize medical care by putting greater emphasis on the NHCs. The goal of decentralization, together with efforts to democratize the health system and encourage greater community participation, led to the enactment of *Decreto 602*, a government decree providing a structure for active participation by health workers and community representatives.

On the NHC level, local health councils (*consejos locales de salud,* hereafter referred to as LHCs) were formed by representatives of health workers' unions and community organizations. The tasks of the LHC were to discuss the health problems of the community, suggest solutions, cooperate in the promotion of health campaigns (anti-diarrhea, broncho-pneumonia prevention, garbage collection, etc.), and act as an advisory link between the NHS and the community.

Still on the NHC level, a second council acted as an executive body (*paritario*). This group included representatives elected from the LHC, in addition to the director of the NHC. The purpose of the *paritario* was to act upon suggestions of the LHC, although ultimate decisions remained in the hands of the medical director.

Analogously, at the area hospital level, parallel councils (*consejos locales del area*) and executive groups (*paritarios*) were also established, with similar tasks and advisory functions. In addition, the area councils participated in comprehensive health planning and the coordination of services and facilities throughout the area.

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As a supplement intended to broaden the provisions of *Decreto 602,* the NHS also initiated a Program of Socio-cultural Development. The Program provided for an integrated health team to work with community members in identifying each locality's basic needs. Cooperating with local organizations, the health team encouraged collective action to combat the diverse problems facing local residents, offered health information, and emphasized the people's direct participation as knowledgeable LHC members.

Decreto 602 provided a first step toward structural changes in the health system. It promised a shift in existing power structures and encouraged community organization. On the other hand, these innovations contained important weaknesses. As established, the councils and health teams did not provide a real change in power relations. Although they included a relatively low proportion of doctors (10 to 20 percent), the LHCs and *paritarios* remained basically advisory in nature. The actual decision-making power stayed in the hands of the medical directors of the NHCs.

Many health workers and community members thoroughly understood these weaknesses. In several localities, the LHCs consolidated their power by mobilizing popular support. Community pressures resulted in a number of concrete accomplishments. For example, one teaching hospital of the Faculty of Medicine of the University of Chile responded to community demands by sending physicians to understaffed NHCs. Other popular goals during this period included a more equitable distribution of existing medical supplies, community control over the hiring and firing of health personnel, extension of LHC hours, and the training of community leaders to perform health-related functions.

As community participation became stronger in late 1972 and early 1973, many LHCs also integrated themselves into other broad-based organizations concerned with food distribution, transportation, local security, and industrial production. When available health facilities appeared inadequate, LHC members took part in autonomous "committees to defend health." These groups became increasingly viable forms of

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popular power. They also provided a basis for the massive efforts needed to maintain health care during the periodic strikes and boycotts by the medical profession.

Hospital level. Paralleling these changes on the neighborhood level, comparable democratization of decision-making occurred in many large hospitals, especially those affiliated with the medical colleges. Within each specialty department (medicine, surgery, pediatrics, etc.) a governing council was formed. This council included elected representatives of non-professional workers (such as janitors, aides, and orderlies) as well as health professionals (doctors and nurses). The governing council made administrative and staffing decisions that had formerly fallen under the exclusive jurisdiction of high-ranking professionals. The influence of the departmental councils extended to the governance of the hospital as an institution, since the departmental councils elected representatives, including non-professional workers as well as physicians, to the council that made policy for the entire hospital.

The Medico-Political Reality: Socialized Health System, Bourgeois Profession

These potential changes in medical power structure occurred with very few compulsory controls. Since the establishment of the National Health Service in 1952, physicians could voluntarily choose to work for it. On the other hand, they could remain in full-time private practice or could pursue private practice in addition to their employment in the NHS. Under certain circumstances, doctors could use NHS hospitals or clinics to see private patients on a fee-for-service basis, in addition to their NHS duties. Ultimately, approximately 90 percent of Chilean physicians worked at least part time for the NHS.

The parallel existence of public and private systems, however, created great inequities. The financial incentives of private practice led physicians not to work full time for NHS or, if they did, to neglect responsibilities for NHS patients by extending time and energy to see additional private patients.

In contrast to other countries with socialist governments, the UP made no direct attempt to suppress private practice, by

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either legal or economic means. The Ministry of Health lamented the country's distributional problems and the costliness of competing public and private sectors. The national agency for health planning envisioned the future creation of a Unified Health Service (*Servicio Unico*) that would centralize the existing resources and redistribute them among the population.

Except for the accomplishments of the LHCs and hospital councils, however, the government's plans for a restructured health system lacked practical force. Despite the government's public intention to restructure the health system, little change occurred in the day-to-day details or control of private practice.

Nonetheless, physicians became increasingly anxious about the general democratization and decline of professional dominance that the UP regime encouraged. The LHCs and hospital councils in several instances requested the removal of physicians employed by the NHS on the grounds that these individuals' private practice outside the NHS interfered with their NHS duties. Doctors feared that the NHS would exert tighter control over the proportion of private patients they could see, especially within NHS facilities. The government's intention of training more paraprofessional health workers also potentially threatened professional dominance. In late 1972, some community organizations began training their own members in various medical tasks. Organized medicine viewed this democratization of expertise with great apprehension.

Physicians' irritation with the UP regime, however, transcended these prospective and largely hypothetical changes that might affect medicine *per se*. As members of Chile's middle and upper classes, physicians complained bitterly about the shortages of goods and services that plagued the entire country during the last period of the UP government.

In 1972, the Chilean Medical Association began a vigorous campaign against the UP government. Although approximately 30 percent of the profession continued to support the UP's goals, the Medical Association issued a series of public denunciations. During the paralyzing "strike" of October 1972, which began as a lockout by the owners of the trucking industry, the majority of physicians refused to see NHS patients except on an emergency

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basis. Hospitals and NHCs continued to function through a combined effort by community residents, the LHCs, paraprofessional and nonprofessional health workers, and a minority of pro-government physicians.

Meanwhile, anti-government doctors continued to see wealthier patients in their private practices. During the weeks immediately preceding the military coup of September 1973, a doctors' strike organized by the Medical Association incapacitated the Chilean health-care system. The medical profession, threatened by a redistribution of power and inconvenienced by economic instability, helped lay the groundwork for military dictatorship.

Chilean Totalitarianism and Its Implications

Chilean totalitarianism has had an enormous impact on the health system. Former directors of the NHCs have been detained in the National Stadium with other political prisoners. At least 35 physicians have been executed or have died after torture. Former medical-school professors, as well as general practitioners, have been imprisoned; torture has been used routinely against doctors and other health workers.

After the coup, the junta's Ministry of Health developed three categories by which medical personnel were to be classified: politically trustworthy; uncertain (to be judged by hospital boards); and politically dangerous ("irredeemable"). The secretary general of the Chilean Medical Association has acknowledged that physicians supporting the junta have participated in denunciations of their leftist colleagues. Generally, denunciations are directed against physicians who opposed the doctors' strike of August 1973. In addition there are numerous reports that some military physicians have cooperated in the administration of torture, particularly by supervising the use of drugs during torture sessions.

The dictatorship has reversed almost all the changes in the medical system that occurred under Allende's government. In low-income and rural areas the new regime has closed nearly all NHCs and has transferred their functions to hospitals that are frequently located at great distances. As a result, low-income

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Chileans again experience severe difficulties in obtaining needed care. The LHCs and consumer-worker councils that governed hospital departments have been disbanded. Control of the nation's hospitals has returned formally to the Chilean Medical Association, which consistently has supported the junta. Most of the preventive health programs (such as free milk distribution to children) have been discontinued or taken over by private entrepreneurs.

The dictatorship has closed most departments of preventive medicine, public health, and social science at the country's medical schools. Faculty members teaching these disciplines have been summarily dismissed; medical students who worked electively in community health programs or who professed leftist political beliefs have been permanently expelled. It is estimated that approximately 12,000 of the 45,000 members of the union representing nonprofessional health workers have been fired without compensation for prior support of the UP government; similarly, 6,000 of the 18,000 members of the union of nonphysician health professionals have lost their jobs. The Chilean NHS has become a paper structure, since the health system has reverted almost exclusively to the control of private practitioners.

If for no other reason, the UP experiment was necessary to show that those who hold professional dominance (as well as economic and political dominance) will not permit a real redistribution of wealth and power without a fight. The Chilean experience documents that a medical elite generally will uphold orderly legal processes only as long as these processes do not threaten the elite's dominant position in society. The actions of Chile's dictatorship demonstrate the tactics used to suppress a people's movement toward a reconstruction of the health system.

Analysis: Health Care, the State, and Social Revolution

Three general themes emerge from the Chilean experience. These themes concern linkages between health care and a nation's political and economic systems, the inherent conflicts of a stratified society that are mirrored in the health system, and the problem of incremental reforms in health care versus fundamental change in state power and the social order.

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In the first place, *in all societies, but especially in the Third World, health care is inextricably linked to a nation's political and economic systems.* Despite many progressive reforms in the health system, the UP government was continually hindered by the limited economic resources available for health care and other public-welfare functions.

Poor nations are especially vulnerable to forces that drain the limited resources they do possess. Like many countries of the Third World, Chile occupies a position of dependency on developed nations. In Chile, vital products like medical instruments and drugs have been imported or have been manufactured in Chile by subsidiaries of American corporations. When the UP government tried to nationalize certain industries, international economic interests created economic havoc in Chile by heavily restricting loans and credits to this highly dependent country. This economic boycott led to the shortages of medical supplies that were so irksome to health professionals.

In addition to dependency, countries like Chile witness the direct extraction of human and natural resources by foreign countries that are more highly developed economically. In the health sector itself, a net flow of resources occurs from the Third World to developed countries. Doctors trained in countries like Chile frequently migrate to developed nations like the United States, leading to an extraction of human resources and an actual loss of capital for the poorer country. Several analysts estimate that because of the flow of physicians trained in the Third World to the United States, Latin America incurs an annual loss of $200 million, an amount that is equivalent to all the medical aid that the United States gave to Latin America for the decade 1960-1970, or equivalent to Chile's total education budget for the year 1970. In the context of dependency and capitalist exploitation, when human and natural resources leave the country in vast quantity, no Third World nation like Chile can expect a real improvement in health care.

A second lesson from the Chilean experience is that *conflicts within the health system mirror in miniature the inherent conflicts of a stratified society.* Any socialist government must confront the problems of social class. Either by birth or by occu-

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pational mobility, health professionals are members of the bourgeois upper or upper-middle class. As such, they have class interests that often impede progress toward a more egalitarian distribution of goods and services.

Doctors, like bankers and corporate managers, possess economic advantages and customary life styles that they do not willingly sacrifice on behalf of the masses of people trapped in an existence of poverty. Besides economic interests, health professionals hold dominant positions in the institutions where they work. Because of their technical expertise, physicians believe that professional dominance over health policies is justified. Any innovations that tend to reduce the profession's power to control the conditions of practice are perceived as threatening.

The Chilean medical profession worked against the UP government's attempts to bring equity and democratization to the health system. Targets of the profession's opposition included the training of paraprofessionals, the reduction of the length of medical education, the encouragement of immigration of foreign doctors, and the development of greater consumer and worker control over health policy. As members of the upper and upper-middle classes, health professionals also value the acquisition of personal consumer goods, which Chile has imported or manufactured largely through foreign loans and credits. The medical profession was acutely sensitive to the economic pressures that reduced available consumer goods. Thus, the UP government faced inherent and continuing conflict with the interests of a bourgeois profession.

Thirdly, and most importantly, *the Chilean experience shows that incremental reforms in health care have little meaning without basic change in the social order.* Allende, assuming the presidency through constitutional electoral procedures, lacked true state power. That is, the coalition government remained heterogeneous and did not hold statutory or *de facto* control over the military, judiciary, legislature, or professions. In the case of medicine, the lack of state power left Allende and his supporters impotent in their attempts to restructure health care. The UP government recognized that the persistence of private practice in Chile hindered the achievement of an equitable

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health system. The government, as well as its leftist critics, acknowledged the costliness and inefficiency of coexisting private and public sectors in health care. Analysts have estimated that under Allende the NHS received 40 percent of Chile's total health expenditures to serve 80 percent of the population, whereas 60 percent of Chile's total health expenditures went to private practitioners caring for 20 percent of the people. The strength of the private sector also continued to encourage a massive maldistribution of health personnel and facilities, favoring wealthier parts of cities as compared to rural or low-income urban areas. Despite the government's best efforts, 60 percent of the nation's physicians remained in the capital of Santiago; within Santiago, wealthier areas commanded approximately six times the resources and personnel of low-income areas.

Although the government instituted a series of programmatic measures to improve the people's health, none of these led to enduring modifications in the health system. Distributing milk to mothers and children falls far short of the structural alterations needed to assure adequate care. Allende and his advisors recognized the inherent inequities of the private-public duality, a schizoid arrangement that always favors the financially advantaged at the expense of the poor. It is difficult to see how Chile's huge problems of maldistribution could be solved without some compulsory restriction of private practice. Similarly, equity could not be achieved without some requirement that all physicians devote at least several years of their careers to national service in urban or rural areas lacking needed personnel. Because the UP government lacked true state power, it made no real attempt to nationalize the health system. The government's intentions of rectifying the inequalities of the private-public duality remained almost entirely theoretical.

Ultimately, Allende viewed his presidency as a transitional period in which a series of reforms would culminate in a true socialist restructuring of society. The government encouraged the establishment of LHCs, workers' organizations, and other new groupings whose eventual purpose was a thorough transformation of power relations in Chilean society. With occasional exceptions, however, these organizations did not achieve their goals of power

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redistribution. Even in the LHCs, designed to involve community residents and health workers broadly in setting health policy, real decision-making power remained in the hands of the medical directors. Although professional dominance persisted, mass mobilization of the people did occur to a limited degree. Nevertheless, despite the government's encouragement of popular control, a basic reordering of traditional power structures remained an elusive goal.

The Chilean experience demonstrates that dominant groups in society do not surrender power peacefully. In this light it appears that a fundamental transformation of power structures is a precondition for popular control of health care. In Chile, where the potential for peaceful socialism and a democratized health system was perhaps greater than anywhere else in the world, the hope that popular control could evolve by peaceful means proved a vain dream. More than ever before, health workers and consumers may learn that the struggle toward a humane health system cannot succeed without a concomitant struggle toward fundamental change in the social order.

P.S. The repression in Chile is unabated. Health workers continue to be among those killed, tortured, imprisoned, or fired from their positions, and left with no source of income for food or other necessities. Those wishing to help should send contributions and/or offers of jobs in the United States or in other countries, for those able to get out of Chile, to the Emergency Committee to Save Chilean Health Workers, c/o Physicians Forum, 510 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10022.

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BOOKS

THE ARAB STASIS

By Aijaz Ahmad

Class Conflict in Egypt: 1945-1970 by Mahmoud Hussein, MR Press, 1973, paperback $4.50. *The Fall of Jerusalem* by Abdullah Schleifer, MR Press, 1972, paperback $3.45. *The Disinherited* by Fawaz Turki, MR Press, 1972, paperback $2.95.

The Arab national revolution and Palestine Resistance as its spearhead today face circumstances more hazardous than any since the war of 1948. In Egypt, the Resistance has had a minimal physical presence; in Syria, it has been forced to serve an auxiliary role within the regular army; in Jordan and Lebanon, three years of massive repression have left the Resistance there quite battered, exhausted, splintered. In the Arab world as a whole, the confrontation between petty-bourgeois and monarchical regimes, which used to give the progressive forces room for maneuver, has faded away. Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the contenders of yesteryear, have closed ranks; and the forging of a comprador monarcho-bourgeois alliance for a frontal attack on the progressive forces all over the Arab world is the single most stunning consequence of the October War. The United States was the clear winner in that war; the Palestinians are the obvious losers.

How did all this come about? Aside from Zionist pressure itself, the case of Egypt is the centerpiece in the history that is now culminating in these most recent configurations. So, before going on to examine the three books under review, let us clarify some crucial aspects of Egyptian politics.

Between the Free Officers' takeover in the early 1950s and

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Nasser's death in 1970, Egypt, and the Arab world generally, labored under massive illusions. As the Ba'athist National Charter later described the period, the working-class movement was put "under the titular guardianship of the petty bourgeoisie." Domestically in Egypt, the placing of the major means of production under state management was heralded as the advent of socialism, and the rise of the petty bourgeoisie was concealed behind the rhetoric of the essential "classlessness" of state capitalism. Three further objectives were realized. First, Nasser's tactical hedging between American and Russian interests was presented as basically anti-imperialist policy; and since the unmistakable American backing of Israel made Egypt inevitably tilt toward Russia, this too was portrayed as proof of socialism and anti-colonialism. Second, the rise of the military elite to domestic pre-eminence was justified by protestations of militant anti-Zionism and claims of prolonged preparations for the final battle against Israel. Third, Nasser's drive for undisputed leadership in the Arab world and the conflict between the Egyptian bourgeoisie and the monarchical forces were presented as the essential elements of an Arab revolution without which no effective strike against Israel was possible.

Furthermore, Nasserist strategies did much to bar the Palestinians from making their own history. Prior to 1967, they were denied the right of autonomous organization and action; and patriots in Egyptian-administered Gaza were mortally punished for commando activities against Israel. Instead, they were called upon to serve in the regular Egyptian army. While demagogues like Shukeiry were given prime time on Cairo radio, Nasser made clear that military initiatives of a mass character would be seriously curtailed. For, claims of Arab brotherhood notwithstanding, the Palestine question has always been seen as a liability by large segments of the Arab petty bourgeoisie. On a personal level, the refugee status of the Palestinians, their political disinheritance, and the poverty of hundreds of thousands of them have elicited sympathy from the masses and the Left but only derision and brutal laughter from the rich and the well-fed in Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt. (Turki's book is filled with instances of this not uncommon pain of the Palestinian refugee.)

On the political plane, Palestine Resistance has signified multiple problems for the Arab ruling elites. First, the national oppression of the Palestinians at the hands of the settler colonialism of Israel is such that nothing short of a people's war can liberate them; and since a people's war is likely to upset the political map

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not only of Israel but of the region generally, Palestinians are seen as a danger to the status quo that presently favors the ruling elites. Second, since the 1936-1939 war of liberation, the Palestinian masses have been committed to the idea of a people's war, and memories of mass resistance are thoroughly fused into other memories of constant betrayal by the regular Arab armies, which have always fought only to compromise. So, despite the bourgeoisification of some segments of the Palestinians, with them revolution, and the concomitant distrust of the ruling elites, is not only a necessity but also a tradition. Third, the Palestinians are the most educated, urbanized and secularized of all Arabs and do not generally partake of the backwardness that is the mainstay of reaction and stasis in the Arab world. Thus, in addition to the need and tradition of revolutionary resistance, and supplementing the nucleus of trained cadre, Palestine has also acquired a revolutionary intelligentsia that is the most advanced in the entire region and therefore a terror to the ruling classes whose stratagems this intelligentsia constantly exposes.

Most significantly, the major weakness of this revolutionary nationality is its dispersal, but this too becomes at least partially an asset as soon as we speak of a revolution that is "Palestinian in origin . . . [but] Arab in extension," as a Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) declaration once put it. Had they all been concentrated into a sort of Bantustan on the West Bank, their struggle could be localized, hidden from other Arab masses, forgotten. But the presence of even a few Palestinians in, say, Cairo is an ever-present reminder of the Zionist affront to the Arab nation; and it constantly politicizes segments in Egypt by advocacy of a people's war and through the support Palestine Resistance unfailingly gives to other Arabs in their own revolutionary efforts, wherever they may be. Had the Resistance achieved its own state, it could teach only as a distant model, as does Democratic Yemen. Lacking such a state, the *fedayeen* teach constantly through examples of personal heroism, and the political leadership teaches through analyses which are widely disseminated. From the standpoint of many Arab elites, this is the more dangerous and persuasive form of teaching.

Within this context, every Arab regime has a vested interest in arresting the revolutionary momentum, particularly because the anti-Zionism of the Arab masses is so intense that too great a military initiative by the Resistance sustained over too long a period would inevitably show up, by comparison, the evasion, the lethargy,

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and the incompetence of the traditional armies; and to the extent that the bad faith of the regimes in question comes to light, mass pressures are likely to grow and the regimes run the risk of being toppled. This crisis is most acute in countries such as Syria and Egypt where regimes call themselves progressive and pretend to political legitimacy.

Syria has resolved the problem by doing essentially three things, though of course with great policy modifications at various stages. First, Syria has so far been consistently more protective of the Resistance than any other Arab country. Second, Syria has forced the Resistance to integrate into the regular army so as to minimize possibilities of autonomous action; the *Al-Saiqa,* the Syrian-based *fedayeen* group, is more integrated into the Syrian army than is any other such group into any other conventional Arab army, and its policies seem to originate with the Syrian government. Third, Syria has always cited its relative powerlessness, always called upon Egypt to take the military initiative, committing itself to do all it can. Let it be said for Assad that he was as good as his word in October 1973, though not thereafter. The only time in the past when Syria failed to deliver on a crucial commitment was during the Jordanian army's massacre of Palestinians in September 1970 when the promised Syrian support failed to materialize. Syria cited and later proved superior pressures; not only the public threat of intervention from Israel, not only a similar but secret threat from the United States, but also and most crucially pressures from Nasser himself.

And so we return to Nasser. Following his monarchical and feudal predecessors, Nasser too pre-empted initiatives of the Resistance by posing the question as one that had to be settled between the conventional Arab armies and the Zionist army, over the heads of the Palestinian people. Considering the balance of armed forces in the area, that type of confrontation of course never came, except on Israeli initiative and to serve Israeli purposes. Nasser's own position had made Egyptian initiative conditional upon Arab unity under his own leadership. But given the inner strife between the monarchical and the petty-bourgeois regimes, and among the various military elites, the hollow call for unity was used for aggrandizement of the Egyptian state bourgeoisie and as a ploy to assimilate the Palestine Resistance into the structure of postponement and eventual compromise with the Zionist state. Furthermore, class contradictions within each of the Arab countries, Egypt included, are so acute that most of the

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state violence flows inward and little of the combative capability remains to fight external enemies.

Let us now look at what the books under review teach us about this general condition. For, different as they are in style and general outlook, the works of Hussein, Schleifer, and Turki are perfectly complementary, in that they portray interrelated aspects of the general stasis.

Turki's is a small book, youthful and largely private. Unlike Schleifer, he does not document diplomatic detail. Unlike Hussein, he formulates no comprehensive theoretical framework. Rather he invents a polemic, fashions a confession, reconstructs an anger. There is something raw and exposed about his anger, like that of the early Nizan, and the nuances of *The Disinherited* frequently remind one of *Aden Arabie,* though there are of course crucial differences. Here the horrors of Zionist-settler colonialism are examined alongside the imbecility, prejudice, and selfishness of the Lebanese petty bourgeoisie, Gradually the human impasse of what is vaguely described as the Palestine question begins to emerge as one in which the Palestinian is allowed neither to return home nor to regain his humanity while residing elsewhere. On the one hand, there is Golda Meir exclaiming, "Who are the Palestinians? They never existed." On the other, there are the several Arab countries where the Palestinian is at once a brother and an outsider, a poor relation, an abstraction whose name will be evoked in time of war but whose supposed manner is taught to monkeys for the amusement of shopkeepers and wandering city officials. Counterposed against this rejection by both enemy and brother is the semi-literate Palestinian mother in refugee camps who teaches her children to speak Arabic in accents of Jerusalem, Jaffa, Beersheba; never to call oneself Jordanian or Lebanese; always to remember that the ancestral lands will have to be one day retaken. Thus it is that a whole epoch of statelessness and private distress is suffered as merely transitional, and from this crucible of memory and dignity the Palestine Resistance is born. This is Turki's affirmation. I disagree with many of his political conclusions; I suspect he is a bit too devoted to notions of individual salvation; I am sorry that he feels so defeated by his stateless status that he welcomes the Bantustan-type state so often proposed for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. But no one can dare deny the integrity inherent in the dialectic of anger and affirmation summarized above.

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With the works of Schleifer and Hussein we are on a different terrain altogether. Instead of the confessional and the polemical, styles here are restrained, with a flair for theory and documentation. *Class Conflict in Egypt* progresses in a majestic sweep of theoretical formulation, with almost exasperating disregard for factual detail, encompassing not only the structure of the Nasserite regime but also the transformation of political economy and class relations in the preceding colonial period. Schleifer's work is microscopic by comparison. He excels by delimiting his scope. With respect to the Arab-Israeli armed encounter, he examines in great detail only the events of April and May 1967 which led to the famous Israeli blitzkrieg of June that year. With respect to the military detail of the June war itself, he concentrates on the fall of Jerusalem city. So restricted is the focus that the early destruction of the Arab air forces, the debacle in the Sinai, the surrender of the Golan barely get mentioned. Around the sharp focus are built fragments of reflections on history, and reflections also on the love affair between man and his city, Schleifer and Jerusalem in this case.

The Fall of Jerusalem is the best descriptive critique of the June war we have had so far. In quintessence, what emerges is a portrait of Nasser trapped in his own rhetoric and miscalculations. Having posed himself as the ultimate anti-Zionist and the ultimate repository of Arab honor, Nasser was vulnerable to indirect Israeli pressure to the point that he had to respond to it everywhere in the Arab world. Taking advantage of this situation and wanting to wage war itself, Israel then began the calculated harassment of Syria and thus forced Nasser's hand. Knowing well that one third of his army was bogged down in the Yemen, that he lacked the wherewithal to fight a major war against Israel, that Russia would never provide him with offensive capability, Nasser found himself forced nonetheless to talk of war, of the closure of the Tiran Straits, and of asking the UNEF to regroup in Gaza and Sharm El-Sheikh. No real mobilization for the ensuing war occurred, the closure of Tiran was never effected, the UNEF did not leave Sharm El-Sheikh altogether until after the war. Nasser's rhetoric, however, gave Israel the chance to portray Egypt as having undertaken the initial violations of peace.

Be that as it may, in difficulties at home and increasingly dependent on Russia abroad, Nasser made two calculations with respect to the anticipated Russian behavior, both fatally mistaken.

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First, he calculated that Russia could not permit a full-fledged war in the Middle East and would force the United States to restrain Israel. Second, he calculated that in the event of war and Egypt's collapse, Russia would be forced to threaten intervention on the scale of 1956, and that the United States would merely look on as it had then. He was wrong. For he misunderstood 1956, when it was in the U.S. interest to see Britain and France evicted from the area, even if it looked provisionally like a Russian victory. By 1967, direct U.S. involvement in the region had increased considerably and the Russians were far less willing to risk direct conflict; unlike 1956, Israel was now allowed to stay in the captured territories indefinitely. Most significantly, the fact that Nasser was looking for an external source of reprieve only points to how out of hand the domestic situation had become. Schleifer does not deal with the domestic situation in Egypt but he does document in great detail two other factors in the Israeli victory of 1967: the unwavering resolve of Israel to wage war and win quickly, and the utter unpreparedness of the Arab masses to resist. For the latter, Schleifer rightly blames the Arab regimes; they would rather see their territories occupied than their people armed. And while Schleifer only documents the details, Hussein's work provides the theoretical framework which accounts for this distrust of the masses.

Let a few things be said right away about *Class Conflict in Egypt*. It is the best book we have in English on petty-bourgeois radicalism in the Arab East. Second, it transcends the limits of Egyptian experience and provides a superb critique of state capitalism wherever it may arise. Third, with its portrait of a state bourgeoisie firmly allied to Russia, Hussein's work is the indispensable polemic against the revisionist Left which has too often identified alliance with Russia as the ultimate guarantee of anti-imperialism, has interpreted the state appropriation of the major means of production as a sufficient precondition for socialism, and has generally upheld the notion of independent development under a regime of the national bourgeoisie even while ties with the world capitalist market remain intact. Let us attempt a summary of the argument.

Colonialism, Hussein maintains, transformed Egypt's political economy by assimilating it into the world capitalist market through the institution of a cash crop economy around cotton production, leading to extreme concentration of landholdings on the one hand, and considerable expansion of the landless rural labor force on the

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other. Export of cotton also gave rise to a commercial bourgeoisie in the cities, allied with both the palace and the British landlords, and largely non-Egyptian in origin: Turkish, Armenian, Jewish, what have you. Finally, structural dependence upon exports not only led to lopsided development in agriculture but also obstructed the growth of a genuine manufacturing bourgeoisie. This basic structure survived and gained strength until the end of the Second World War when at least four new elements were introduced. (1) The crisis of obstructed capitalism became more acute as a result of price fluctuations in the world capitalist market. (2) British imperialism entered a period of worldwide decline, and the crisis of world capitalism generated new anti-imperialist energies everywhere, including Egypt. (3) Zionist aggression peaked in the 1948 war and in turn convinced the patriotic elements that in order to win, Egypt had to restructure itself thoroughly. (4) The working-class movement reached unprecedented proportions, as was evidenced in the strikes of 1946.

The Free Officers' coup came in response to all these factors. Nasser co-opted the widespread anti-imperialist sentiment by flamboyantly opposing the presence of the British army and by proclaiming that he alone could prepare Egypt for war against Zionism. For the masses, he created the illusion of abolishing large-scale private property by instituting the state capitalist system, thus co-opting the working-class movement. For the petty bourgeoisie, his system opened up a vast new sector of employment and authority, and the opportunity to become, in the fullness of time, a state bourgeoisie. For the ruling class, it rationalized production to an extent and made possible rates of accumulation and investment otherwise unattainable in the context of severely underdeveloped capitalism based on individual property. Finally, the regime took full advantage of the Cold War, playing Russian interests against American, and taking advantage of conflicts between the ascendant U.S. imperialism and the declining imperialisms of Britain and France. This last factor was seen most starkly at the time of the tripartite aggression of 1956.

Relative rationalization of production under state hegemony led to a degree of development for about a decade, but the underlying structural causes of underdevelopment remained and led to the resurgence of the crisis in the middle 1960s when the system had reached its outer limits and the matured state bourgeoisie, having achieved considerable private accumulation, began to demand denationalizations and opportunities for private investment,

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so that it could become a capitalist class in the classical sense. Egypt's dependence on Russia, nonexistent in 1956, had by then reached the proportions of a metropolis-satellite relation. Conversely, Russian capitulation on a world scale had advanced considerably, and in the world marketplace the Russian state bourgeoisie had begun to play second fiddle to the U.S. bourgeoisie. Then came the war of 1967.

With that defeat, the Nasserite regime lost even its marginal autonomy with respect to the more reactionary elements of the ruling class, who now forced their policy imperatives upon Nasser. He was forced to separate the Palestine national question from the question of the occupied Egyptian territories and to offer recognition to Israel if it would return the Egyptian territories; that was the significance of accepting UN Resolution 242 and offering to open negotiations. He also began to accept U.S. hegemony in the area, as was signalled by his acceptance of the Rogers Plan. In 1968-1969 he crushed waves of patriotic demonstrations with unprecedented savagery, while making major concessions to the commercial bourgeoisie in both private and public sectors. Finally, he accepted dispersal of the Palestine Resistance without a cry of protest, as was the case during the Jordanian massacres in September 1970, when he watched it all silently and then got Yasser Arafat to shake Hussein's bloody hand. Then Nasser died.

Sadat took over initially as an innocuous compromise candidate, outflanking Zakaria Mohieddin on the Right and Aly Sabry on the official Left. He moved quickly to cement his relationship with the capitalist sectors by encouraging Western capital, allowing far greater participation of private capital in the state sector, banning further land seizures and returning some of the already confiscated lands to the traditional feudal owners. Then, in May 1971, he ousted Aly Sabry, Sharaway Gomaa, and Muhammed Fawzi, the chief spokesmen of the anti-Western elements within the bureaucratic elite—Sabry as head of the Socialist Union and Fawzi as War Minister had urged a more belligerent stance toward Israel. Russia reacted with characteristic opportunism by signing a 15-year treaty of friendship barely a month after the ouster of her closest friends in the regime. Sadat added insult to injury a year later when he ousted 15,000 Russian "technicians" in the summer of 1972. The drift toward the United States was now irrevocable. Throughout the 1971-1973 period, Sadat was faced with considerable public resistance, exemplified by the workers' strike at the Helwan steel mills and by repeated student protests

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which immobilized Cairo at the beginning of 1972 and again at the end of the year and the beginning of the next. But the movement petered out, as had the tremendous patriotic upsurge of 1968-1969, owing to lack of ideological clarity and organizational framework, not to speak of the tightening repression. Sadat's only conciliatory gesture toward militant anti-Zionist sentiment during this period was his appointment of Saadeddin Shazli as Chief of Staff. (Shazli later led the Egyptian army with honor during the October War but was unceremoniously, and to all appearances inexplicably, fired the week after the cease-fire.)

We cannot understand the October War without understanding the class contradictions it epitomized. By 1973, the Egyptian bourgeoisie had decided on full acceptance of overall U.S. hegemony and the regional supremacy of the oil sheikhdoms whose money this dependent bourgeoisie now needed. But there were problems. The United States had not responded much to the "soft line" of accepting the Rogers Plan, ousting Russia's technicians and friends, inviting in U.S. capital that included the oil interests, even appointing such men as Aziz Sidky to high posts like that of Prime Minister; more had to be done. In Faisal's eyes, meanwhile, Egypt was still a bit too close to the "radical" regimes of Libya and Syria, too benign toward the anti-monarchical forces in the Gulf region, too stiff with Hussein and the sheikhs. On the domestic front, however, Sadat was losing support by failing to liberate the occupied territories; and the rising tide of worker-student militancy, particularly in early 1973, showed that Sadat's only chance of arresting the growth of a mass movement was to outflank the Left from a position of the farther Left: by launching, for example, a war before the universities reopened in mid-October.

The war did not run altogether counter to U.S. thinking, passing displeasure notwithstanding. First, Russia could be trusted to withhold critical support, thus causing a rapidly deteriorating military situation for the Arabs on the ground, which in turn could be used later to discredit Russia and to gain further concessions from the Arab regimes during the ensuing negotiations. Second, propaganda machines could be cranked up around the so-called "oil weapon" to give Faisal a nationalist press he had never enjoyed before. Third, enough military and economic havoc could be caused for Syria to force it to abandon its belligerent stance and join the monarcho-bourgeois alliance of Faisal and Sadat. Fourth, the changed situation after the war could be used

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to impose upon the battered and confused *fedayeen* a solution that would discredit them if they took it and isolate them if they didn't, i.e., the West Bank Bantustan. Lastly, a "final solution" of the Palestine question would pave the way for regional cooperation among the Israeli and Arab elites and thus free the United States to shift its main attention from the eastern Mediterranean to the Gulf region where the most important strategic interests are in fact located.

We shall have to save a fuller analysis of the October War for another day. Suffice it to say here that the objectives summarized above have been largely realized. It is now reliably reported that even as the United States delivered sophisticated missiles and Phantoms to Israel on the Egyptian territory of Al-Arish, Russia refused to provide comparable aircraft and made fresh deliveries of SAM-6 missiles conditional upon acceptance of the cease-fire: such are the results of détente. Imposition of the cease-fire was timed to make Egypt accept an impossible situation on the ground, and to corner Iraq and Syria into a situation where they had either not to launch the counter-offensive for which they were by then prepared or to launch it when Egypt was already out of the war and Israel was released to concentrate entirely on the Syrian front: it is not for nothing that Sadat did not dare tell his Syrian and Iraqi counterparts of his acceptance of the cease-fire (they heard of it only on the radio), and Shazli, the most competent commander in the Arab East, was fired for refusing to accept this absurd capitulation.

Since the war, Sadat has presented the Arab world with a series of concessions to Israel as accomplished facts; permitted a campaign against the Nasserite nationalizations in the newspapers, including *Al-Ahram*; denationalized some sectors of the economy and promised further denationalizations; restored full diplomatic relations with the United States; kissed Henry Kissinger's cheek, Arab-fashion, exclaiming, "my friend, my brother." Not only Sadat but also Qadaffi and Boumedienne are courting Faisal with an energy not seen in the Arab world since the first fissures appeared in the relationship between the petty bourgeois regimes and the monarchies in the early 1950s. Since December, Iran has been attacking the borders of Iraq—the only Arab state other than Democratic Yemen that is not a party to the capitulation—to warn not only Iraq but also Syria, which is under pressure to unite with Iraq: Assad, who needed little prodding, is now going the way of Sadat. Meanwhile, the Palestine Liberation

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Organization delegation that visited Moscow has been told flatly that it has to accept the "fact" of Israel and work toward a state in the West Bank and Gaza. The Resistance is thoroughly split. The Palestinian Right is of course overly worked up about the prospects of being admitted to the halls of Geneva. Even the Left does not know its own mind. Nayef Hawatmey, of the Democratic Front, for example, is already advocating the acceptance of such a state as a "tactical achievement in the present period," while "the strategic aim of a united Palestine" is shelved in favor of a longer perspective. The absurdity in the situation, of course, is that only Egypt and Russia have proposed this state as a provisional bargaining position; Israel has mentioned no such thing; Arafat, Hawatmey *et al.* are falling over each other to take the crumbs that have not yet fallen from the table. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Arab Liberation Front have rejected such a solution and are being dubbed "Left adventurists."

Arab reaction is in bloom; and Egypt, the showpiece of "national democracy" in the Middle East, has reached a dead end. Three main contributing factors can be cited. First, as Russia's client, Egypt has had its autonomy severely restricted, so that Russia's capitulation on a global scale has led necessarily to the regional capitulation of its Egyptian protégés as well. Second, the Egyptian state bourgeoisie has reached a stage where its capitalist interests can best be served through direct alliance with the United States, the oil-rich sheikhdoms, and eventually Israel. Third, the subjective factor has always been rather weak in Egypt and, sporadic revolts notwithstanding, left Communism in Egypt has never taken on much of an organizational form. Mahmoud Hussein analyzes the first two of these factors superbly but is weak on the last point, for he continually posits a myth of "the masses," a veritable mystique of spontaneity, thus distorting the subjective factor. In reality, the state bourgeoisie has entrenched itself so very successfully precisely because right Communists have actively obstructed the rise of revolutionary organizations and left Communists have relied overly upon spontaneous revolts.

Now that the ruling elite is shedding its progressive rhetoric and is making open alliances with extreme reaction, the ideological hold of the regime is likely to weaken. And if Sadat fails, as I think he will, in obtaining from Israel even those marginal concessions necessary to satisfy the minimum demands of national dignity, the political legitimacy of the regime will erode altogether. That's when the subjective preparedness will count most.

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CORRESPONDENCE

THE THEORY OF NATIONALISM

A Case of Underdevelopment

Yousef Al-Haythem, in his letter on "MR and *New Outlook*" (MR, October 1974), bases his criticism of MR on a principle which, he insists, "all serious socialists and Marxists must agree upon," that of "unconditional support of the right of all nations to self-determination." Most revolutionary socialists in the United States would unquestioningly support this principle, rhetorically at least. But I would suggest that the notion that nations have an *absolute* right to self-determination is sometimes misleading, often meaningless, and occasionally reactionary.

It is easy to cite cases where groups have raised the banner of "national self-determination" in support of clearly reactionary policies, often with at least a semblance of substantial popular support. To cite just one well-known example, there was the Katangese secession movement in the Congo (now Zaire) in 1960, backed fully by foreign imperialism. Do we "unconditionally" support such a movement? Or to take a different kind of example, many leftists have been very critical of China for its prompt recognition of the Chilean junta, a move supposedly justified by the principle of noninterference in the domestic affairs of other nations (the immediate corollary of the principle of self-determination). We rightly are angered by the U.S. intervention in Chile to promote the coup, of course, but the reason for our anger is the reactionary and brutal politics of the junta, not our adherence to the

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abstract right of self-determination of the Chilean people. Indeed, I imagine that most "serious socialists and Marxists" would have rejoiced had some (unfortunately mythical) nation *intervened* in Chile to prevent or reverse the coup.

Two points emerge from examples such as these. First, nationalism and claims to self-determination do *not* merit universal and *unconditional* support. On the contrary, they must be seen as thoroughly *subordinate* to internationalist revolutionary socialism. As Lenin, defending rejection by Marx and Engels of "the claims of the small nationalities of the Habsburg monarchy" argued: "The right of self-determination is one of the demands of democracy which must naturally be subordinated to the general interests of democracy." (E. H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution,* Penguin edition, vol. 1, p. 420.)

Such a position may lead us to reject some claims to national self-determination (e.g., Katanga) and to accept and support others, but with a very skeptical and critical eye. For example, the nationalisms of North Africa and the Middle East have certainly played a major and progressive role in challenging imperialist hegemony in those areas. But even the most militantly anti-imperialist of these nations (e.g., Algeria, Iraq, Libya) have made only limited gains in challenging internal class exploitation. And our revolutionary duty to challenge the state sponsorship of militant religion in some of them (e.g., Libya) and the endemic sexism of all of these societies cannot be evaded by glib rhetoric about "self-determination." Similarly, though we fully recognize the imperialist nature of Zionism, it is at the very least disquieting that the Palestine Liberation Organization is heavily backed by the fantastically reactionary government of Saudi Arabia. This support presumably stems from, among other things, a Saudi belief that the PLO would be a powerful bulwark *against* revolutionary socialism in Palestine.

More generally, what this kind of problem reveals is the shallowness of current Marxian theoretical understanding of the entire phenomenon of nationalism in its late twentieth-century forms. Unthinking adherence to Stalin's sixty-year-old formulations on the national question have impeded work on this subject for too long. To cite just one of the historically inadequate assumptions underlying the classical Bolshevik analysis of nationalism (summarized in Note B to Carr's *The Bolshevik Revolution,* vol. 1): the Bolsheviks saw the liberation movements in the African and

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Asian colonies as playing a significant part in the overall process of socialist revolution. But they also believed that the socialist revolution would spread to the entire world relatively rapidly: i.e., they believed that the anticolonial *nationalist* movements were part of an *internationalist* social revolution which would in effect *end* nations, at least in anything resembling their bourgeois form. Again, to cite Lenin: "The overthrow of the bourgeoisie will tremendously accelerate the collapse of every kind of national *partition* without decreasing . . . the 'differentiation' of humanity, if we are to understand by this the wealth and variety of spiritual life, trends of ideas, tendencies, shadings." (Cited in Horace Davis, *Nationalism and Socialism,* Monthly Review Press, p. 206.) The Bolsheviks certainly did not envision that the liberation movements would lead to stable, nonrevolutionary governments lasting for decades, any more than they imagined that Soviet Russia would alone hold up the banner of socialism for three decades following the October Revolution. The assumptions of the Bolsheviks' analysis of nationalism need much more extensive review; my point here is simply to suggest that their analysis cannot be uncritically transferred to the present day.

One of the central problems which illustrates the inadequacy of our current understanding of nationalism is, who defines what is a nation? In the case of a colony, where we can trace a recent history of conquest and exploitation, the problem is relatively simple (e.g., the cases of the African colonies seeking independence in the 1950s and 1960s). More generally, two positions are open to us:

(1) We can define a set of abstract and general criteria for nationhood. This was the method of Stalin, who defined a nation as "a historically evolved stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture." The trouble is, it is precisely the cases which are not *self-evidently* nations, even without the formality of a general definition, that lead us into difficulties. Take two cases which involve groups of people who subjectively experience feelings of self-identification (i.e., of "nationalism") but who do not fit Stalin's criteria—the Jews and the blacks in the United States.

As we know all too well, the notion of "a people without a land" applied to the Jews gets us into *lots* of trouble. But despite the fact that the Jews didn't have a "territory," Jewish nationalism was and is a real, subjective phenomenon among Jews; it can-

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not be dismissed as merely an imperialist manipulation. If the abstract definitions should lead us to define the nationalism of Jews as unreal or not worthy of respect, it seems to me we lose all moral right to speak for people who are claiming nationhood anywhere.

It is equally difficult to translate black "nationalism" into positive political programs. The Black Belt has been rapidly depopulated; blacks have been dispersed all over the country and especially into giant multiracial (if segregated) metropolises. Blacks are thoroughly mixed into the white-dominated industrial economy. It is hard, in this context, to imagine concretely what on earth "self-determination" can possibly mean. We can propose some vague notion of autonomy, which would be powerless to deal with the fundamental economic questions faced by blacks. Or we can turn to the idea of a national home for blacks (e.g., "self-determination for the Black Belt," which is still parroted by some left groups today). Given the real geographic distribution of blacks today, this sets us up for an eerie recreation of the Zionist debacle. Yet many radicals, black and white, insist on defining racism and exploitation of blacks in the United States as a "national question," despite the obvious inadequacy of the analysis generated by this purely rhetorical definition.

But if over-general definitions of nationhood are inadequate, how *can* we define "nation"? The only definition logically consistent with "unconditional support of the right . . . to self-determination" is to let the people of the supposed nation themselves decide: if they decide they are a nation, then they are a nation. This quickly gets us into grave difficulties. For example, the Chilean generals claim that they are the true representatives of the Chilean nation. We, of course, reject the reactionary bourgoisie's defense of the coup as "self-determination of the Chilean people." But the self-defining-nation approach cannot justify our rejection. There simply is no logical or objective way to prove that the generals are not, in fact, the representatives of the nation. Sometimes the Left argues (properly, I think) that elections, for instance, would not necessarily reflect the popular will. (Otherwise we should be compelled to reject the Puerto Rican independence movement.) When we reject the generals' claim to be the representatives of the Chilean people, then, are we really asserting that the majority supported Allende and that that makes him and not the generals the legitimate representative of national self-deter-

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mination? Clearly the issue is not one of majorities. Aside from the factual question of where majority support was in Chile near the end of the Allende period, if nationhood is determined by majority opinion among the population of a region, where does the notion of national *minorities* having a right to self-determination come from? The notion of a nation as self-defining is thus simply inadequate, at least if we insist that the Left provide "unconditional support" for the self-defined nation.

It is a truism that nationalism has been one of the dominant forces of the twentieth century. It is equally evident that the twentieth-century Left has shattered itself on nationalism and related ethnicism more often than nationalism has been the torch leading the way to socialist revolution. (The case of Vietnam is the standout exception, of course.) It's time to admit that as Marxists we simply have no adequate understanding of the phenomenon. I would hope that MONTHLY REVIEW, as an unquestionable supporter both of national anti-imperialist movements and of socialist internationalism, would pay more critical attention to the sadly underdeveloped theory of nationalism.

John Ehrenreich

Syosset, New York
November 1974

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HIPPIES AND THE LEFT

I enjoyed Paul Sweezy's (Charles Bettelheim's) exposé of the bankruptcy of economism in the November 1974 MR. I found the analysis timely and cogent. The terms were well defined:

> What is common to all forms of economism, whether rightist or "leftist," is that they all objectively favor the short-term or medium-term outlook and interests of a particular segment or segments of the population, and hence tend to strengthen and perpetuate social divisions. Marxism, on the other hand, is quintessentially the body of thought which identifies the long-term interests of the *whole* population and provides a guide to their realization.

But, alas, I had to continue reading to the end of that same issue of MR to find "Marxists" identifying hippies and the New Left with the worst elements of capitalism (the bourgeoisie). Moreover, the concerns of the New Left and hippies to overcome traditional sexual roles, thus developing the seeds for an anti-sexist society, were posed against the needs of other oppressed sections of the people:

> For the ghetto black, the reservation Amerindian, the slum-dwelling Chicano, the Appalachian and Southern poor white and black, the industrial working class . . . and the working poor of the Third World, spontaneity and sexual liberation rank far down the scale indeed in comparison to the need for decent housing, food, clothing, meaningful work and freedom from oppression and exploitation. But for the well-off petty bourgeois intellectual, student, and hippie youth, living as they do off the fruits of the laboring classes . . . and engaged as they are in easy, *interesting* [? ? ! !], nonproductive labor, the world is already a post-industrial society in need of a "sex-pol" revolution. (Correspondence from Mark Mussachia, p. 55)

While I wish I had the space to challenge many of the assumptions in this statement, I can now only comment that these "Marxists" have not opened their eyes to observe empirically the proletarianization of the New Left and their "hippie" concerns, nor do they have an open theoretical schema within which to incorporate the rich legacy of our most recent past.

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As a dedicated activist and reader of MR, I was disappointed with such a dangerous ideological bias within the journal as to print uncritically the quoted Correspondence.

I often wonder why Vietnamese Marxists point predominantly to positive aspects of hippies, the New Left, and all people, while most "Marxists" portray only the negative. I believe this error undermines the long-run unity and solidarity of all oppressed peoples.

George Katsiaficas

December 1974
San Diego, California

A COMMENT ON RECENT MR BOOKS

No other publisher in America has put out a more vital and important list of new books than has the Monthly Review Press. All of those you have been kind enough to send me are outstanding.

Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Chile is the only competent book about the most important event in Latin America in this decade and the most shameful and disgraceful chapter in the United States' relations with Latin America in two hundred years. All my Chilean friends have been murdered, are in jail being tortured, or in exile. A beautiful and courageous people have been trampled under foot. In this book are presented the unerring and brilliant prophecy of Paul M. Sweezy and Harry Magdoff in November 1970, the step by step undermining of the Allende government, and its final overthrow by the CIA, the State Department, and the Chilean militarists. If American imperialism is coming to an end, as some believe, then there are still a lot of kicks in the dying mule.

Juan Angel Silén's book *We, The Puerto Rican People* is a vivid portrayal of the Broken Bootstrap era of Puerto Rico. It is high time that the truth about the island be told to the American people. This is a sturdy beginning.

Pedro Pietri in his *Puerto Rican Obituary* is a savage, frightening outcry of the Puerto Rican exiled to Manhattan. His flippant disrespect, ferocious irony, and heartrending anguish will live with me always. This is poetry that strikes out from the very

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guts, the daily desperation, and the broken heart of the author. Unforgettable!

Above all I value Robert Márquez's bilingual anthology *Latin American Revolutionary Poetry.* Here is the authentic voice of the new Latin America. These vivid driving poems ring out the old and ring in the new, the Latin America being born. Unfortunately President Ford world not understand these poems or their ringing truth; for Mr. Kissinger, who helped perpetrate the Chilean massacre, they would have no meaning. Yet here are the real voices of the people of the southlands, not the ideas and hypocrisies of their exploiters at home and from abroad. Here are celebrated the heroes and martyrs of human liberty in our time; these poems battle alongside the people for a decent life.

Presently I shall send you my views on that Egyptian giant Samir Amin and his giant book *Accumulation on a World Scale.* His range is truly world-wide, his insight remarkable, his scholarship impeccable. A smashing good book.

And thanks heartily to you,

Carleton Beals

October 1974
Killingworth, Connecticut

There is an intimate relation between the poorhouse and the prison. Both are made necessary in a society which is based upon exploitation. The aged and infirm who remain docile and submissive through the struggle for existence, to whatever straits it may reduce them, are permitted to spend their declining days in the county house and to rest at last in the potters' field.

But they who protest against their pitiless fate rather than yield to its stern decrees, they who refuse to beg, preferring to take the chances of helping themselves by whatever means seem most available, are almost inevitably booked for the jail and the prison.

—Eugene V. Debs

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(*Continued from inside front cover*)

out of the question now for purely financial reasons. Under the circumstances we will have to muddle along as best we can, asking for the patience, understanding, and indulgence of everyone concerned. With respect to the handling of manuscripts, this means that there will normally be a delay of weeks or even months between receipt (which, however, will always be acknowledged promptly and acceptance or rejection, and that in case of rejection, explanations and comments will usually be minimal or absent. This procedure should not be interpreted as implying a negative judgment: many more mss. are submitted than can be accepted, and many considerations necessarily enter into the decision to accept or reject. Authors who submit a manuscript and then for any reason—e.g., because of a possibility of publication elsewhere—want to withdraw it can do so by simply dropping us a note to that effect. Manuscripts which are too long for MR (see Notes from the Editors in the March issue) or fall outside the scope of the magazine may be returned unread. Authors should obviously keep all these things in mind in deciding whether to submit manuscripts.

MR and the *National Guardian* (predecessor of the present-day *Guardian*) were launched within a few months of each other back in 1948-1949, and in the process the respective editors often exchanged ideas, information, and advice. This background is one reason why we were especially pleased at the recent announcement that our old friend Jim Aronson, one of the founders and for many years co-editor or editor of the NG, had been the recipient of an annual award given by the Alumni Association of the Columbia School of Journalism. The citation reads "for the advancement of responsible journalism in all its forms, in a lifetime of service." Accurate and richly deserved. Jim, who is now an associate professor in the Department of Communications at Hunter College, is presently working on a history of the NG with Cedric Belfrage, a co-founder.

The first issue of the new German edition of MR appeared in April. The format and cover are very similar to the English edition, and a quick sampling indicates that the quality of the translations is good. MR is thus now published in three languages in addition to English—Italian, Greek, and German (the Spanish edition, most recently published in Bogota, was forced to discontinue last year for financial reasons). Correspondence regarding the German edition should be addressed to: Monthly Review Deutsche Ausgabe, D-6000 Frankfurt 1, Julius Heymannstr. 1, Federal Republic of Germany.

Not one but two MR Press books have finally made it into a book club, the Macmillan Book Clubs—Library of Political and International Affairs. *The United States and Chile: Imperialism and the Overthrow of the Allende Government,* by James Petras and Morris Morley, is a major selection for release in July or August; and *Labor and Monopoly Capital,* by Harry Braverman, is an alternate choice for August.

Last fall the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) published a 264-page book, *Guatemala,* which is very useful not only for those specially interested in that country but also as a case study for all of Latin America, and which at $5 plus 50¢ postage is a real bargain in comparison with the general run of today's book prices. Order from Box 226, Berkeley, Calif. 94701, or Box 57, Cathedral Station, New York City 10025.

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